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I. INTRODUCTION
"Debt, n. An ingenious substitute for the chain and whip of
the slave-driver." 1
The satirical words of Ambrose Bierce ring true with respect to the
current student debt crisis in the United States. For many years, the
United States has prided itself on offering citizens the opportunity for a
better life through higher education. The rise in both cost and risk of pursuing that education, and the subsequent rise in student debt, threatens the
survival of that ideal. The advancing student debt crisis lends credence to a
more provocative and depressing label than the proverbial broke college
student-the hopeless college graduate.
Today's college students are not just financially laden during their college years, but for many years afterward. Some college graduates have become slaves to their student debt and are legally ill-equipped to break the
chains of fiscal hopelessness. The idea of a Ramen' noodle diet is no
longer a facetious attempt to belittle financial insecurity; instead it has become a startling reality for many aspiring college graduates. Given the current economic constraints on employment, many college graduates are
facing mountains of debt with no job prospects or, alternatively, an inadequately paying job. The result, in many cases, is that these college graduates simply cannot afford to pay their debts-including student loan debt.
In short, American students have become an "Indentured Generation." 3
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 28 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1958).
2. "Ramen" refers to the Americanized, instant (usually microwavable) noodle dish available at
any number of franchise and local grocery stores in the United States. How Much Do Ramen Noodles
Cost?, available at http://www.howmuchisit.org/how-much-do-ramen-noodles-cost/ (last accessed Jan.
29, 2014). Generally, the average price of a single serving pack of instant Ramen noodles, or the more
popular "Cup noodles," ranges from $0.25 to $1.00, though more bargain prices may be obtained if
purchased in bulk or acquired on special sales days. See id. Nonetheless, the dish referenced here
should not to be confused with the authentic, and probably more expensive, Japanese Ramen dish that
may be found at traditional Japanese restaurants.
3.

Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation:Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53

SANTA

L. REV. 329, 330 (2013) (asserting that "[a] generation of Americans has borrowed heavily for
their education, and hundreds of thousands of them are deeply in debt. Some thirty-seven million
Americans owe a total of approximately one trillion dollars in student loans. They constitute an Indentured Generation as many of them will be burdened with student loan debt for much of their lives.")
(internal citations omitted).
CLARA
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Where once a college degree all but guaranteed employment in a specialized field, today it guarantees little more than the opportunity for employment. Gambling on immense debt to finance a relatively expensive
postsecondary education, simply to keep pace with other prospective members of the workforce, has become an integral part of the American way of
life. Nonetheless, the common adage that a college or graduate education
is an investment is truer now more than ever. Such an axiom has become a
surreal proclamation that associates dire consequences with post-graduate
unemployment or underemployment.
Furthermore, the inequitable intrusion of for-profit educational institutions or colleges4 into the arena of postsecondary education is an emerging problem. For-profit institutions are not inherently malign. But as their
label infers, the goal of these institutions is to make "profit." Current industry trends support the notion that these institutions are neither centrally
focused on providing an affordable, quality education nor focused on ensuring graduate success. As a result, for-profit institutions contribute to the
current amount of outstanding student loan debt to a substantial and disproportionate degree. Given the for-profit industry's pitfalls in education
and high tuition costs, many for-profit students face an increased risk of
post-graduate, financial insolvency. Even bankruptcy cannot help these
students because student loans are presumptively nondischargeable under
the Bankruptcy Code. There is a need for comprehensive federal legislation that would help such unfortunate for-profit student-debtors, as well as
synchronously provide subtle education reform of the postsecondary forprofit industry so as to mitigate the for-profit industry's adverse impact on
the student debt crisis.
This Comment will proceed as follows: Section II will offer a brief
background of bankruptcy law, highlight the progressive treatment of student loan debt under the United States Bankruptcy Code, and briefly outline proposed legislation affecting discharge of student loan debt in
bankruptcy; Section III will provide a brief discussion of the current student debt crisis, while focusing on the postsecondary for-profit industry's
exacerbation of the crisis, and also provide critical analysis of current efforts to address developing problems; Section IV will propose a more
workable, comprehensive solution to emerging problems by amending the
Bankruptcy Code, specifically 11 U.S.C. § 523, so as to permit qualified forprofit student-debtors to presumptively discharge private student loans in
bankruptcy.

4. For-profit colleges, also known as proprietary institutions or career colleges, are postsecondary schools that are generally owned and operated by private organizations and corporations, some of
which are publicly-traded entities. See infra Section III(A)(2).
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BRIEF BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT LAW

Debt forgiveness is not a novel concept. Debt forgiveness, a fundamental aspect of bankruptcy, can be traced to Biblical times.5 In Biblical
times, as divine law required, the year of Jubilee (the Holy year) was a
predetermined year when all individual debt was perpetually forgiven without reservation.6 Consequently, the practice of debt forgiveness was exclusively debtor-friendly. In stark contrast, the birth of bankruptcy law in
England during the Sixteenth Century fostered a heavy creditor-friendly
system.
In 1542, England enacted the first bankruptcy law entitled "An act
against such persons as do make bankrupts," which applied exclusively to
merchant debtors who were unable to maintain financial solvency. 7 Essentially, under this law, bankruptcy was considered a crime.8 The law
criminalized insolvency and gave creditors formidable means of legal redress to collect against bankrupt merchant debtors.9 Additionally, creditors were permitted to institute proceedings akin to modern-day
liquidation proceedings against merchant debtors whereby a debtor's property was sold and the proceeds distributed amongst his creditors pro rata.' °
Even so, the debt was not wholly forgiven if the share received by a particular creditor was insufficient to settle the debt owed to that creditor."
Creditors were able to pursue collection from debtors even after the estate's liquidation and pro rata distribution. 2 However, "more humanitarian legislative treatment of honest but unfortunate debtors" came in 1705
with the passage of the Statute of Anne. 3 The Statute of Anne introduced
the concept of discharging debt for the benefit of the debtor, not the creditor. 4 Given the United States' English roots, this idea of discharging debt
for the benefit of the debtor emerged during the development of federal
bankruptcy law in the United States.

5. See DEUTERONOMY 15:1-2 (King James Cambridge Ed.) ("At the end of every seven years
thou shalt make a release. And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto
his neighbour shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbour, or of his brother; because it is called
the LORD'S release."), available at http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Deuteronomy-15-2/ (last accessed Nov. 1, 2013); see also LEvrricus 25:12 (King James Cambridge Ed.) ("In the year of this jubile
ye shall return every man unto his possession."), available at http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Leviticus-25-13/ (last accessed Nov. 1, 2013).
6. Id.
7. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. BANKR.
INST. L. Rav. 5, 7-9 (1995).
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 8, 10.
14. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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The general purpose of bankruptcy is to provide qualified, honest, and
unfortunate debtors with a fresh start or a means of financial rehabilitation.1 5 The current Bankruptcy Code is primarily based on the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 197816 ("BRA"), which enacted Title Eleven of the United
States Code ("Bankruptcy Code"). In the 1978 reform, Congress made
several dynamic changes to the law; one change specifically addressed the
treatment of student loan debt in bankruptcy.
A.

The Presumption Against Discharge of Student Loan Debt

The most notable reform fostered by the BRA was the development of
17
specialized chapters of bankruptcy under which debtors could seek relief.
But, the treatment of student loans in bankruptcy arising under the BRA
should be noted as equally significant reform. In 1970, Congress established a Commission to review federal bankruptcy law and provide recommendations for reform ("1970 Commission"). 18 Among the 1970
Commission's many proposals was to place limitations on the discharge of
student debt.1 9 After much debate, in November 1978, Congress adopted
an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code based on the proposals by the 1970
15. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) ("This Court has certainly acknowledged that
a central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder
their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt' . . . . But in the
same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start' policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act
limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate
debtor."') (internal citation omitted).
16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2013)).
17. The following provides a brief overview of the principal chapters of the Bankruptcy Code:
"Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a liquidation proceeding available to consumers and businesses. Those assets
of a debtor that are not exempt from creditors are collected and liquidated (reduced to money), and the
proceeds are distributed to creditors. A consumer debtor receives a complete discharge from debt
under Chapter 7, except for certain debts that are prohibited from discharge by the Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a procedure by which an individual or a business can reorganize its
debts while continuing to operate. The vast majority of Chapter 11 cases are filed by businesses. The
debtor, often with participation from creditors, creates a plan of reorganization under which to repay
part or all of its debts. Chapter 12 allows a family farmer or a fisherman to file for bankruptcy, reorganize its business affairs, repay all or part of its debts, and continue operating. Chapter 13, often called
wage-earner bankruptcy, is used primarily by individual consumers to reorganize their financial affairs
under a repayment plan that must be completed within three or five years. To be eligible for Chapter
13 relief, a consumer must have regular income and may not have more than a certain amount of debt,
as set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 15 provides debtors, creditors, and other parties in interest involved in insolvency cases in foreign countries a mechanism by which they can assert their rights.
Generally, a chapter 15 case is supplementary to a primary case or proceeding commenced in a debtor's
home country. One of the primary goals of this chapter is to encourage cooperation and communication between the courts of the United States and parties in interest and foreign courts and parties in
interest in cross-border cases." United States Department of Justice: U.S. Trustee Program, Overview
of Bankruptcy Chapters (updated Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ustleo/publicaf
fairs/factsheet/docs/fs0l.htm (last accessed Dec. 28, 2013) (emphasis added).
18. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970) (specifying that the commission
be "known as the congressional Commission on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States").
19. Johnson v. Mo. Baptist Coll. (In re Johnson), 218 B.R. 449, 451 (1998) (citing REP. OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. I & It(1973)).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 33:401

Commission. In doing so, Congress created the presumption against student loan discharge (the "Presumption") and codified it at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) ("§ 523(a)(8)"), which methodically disallows qualified debtors
to discharge student loan debt in bankruptcy. 2° Today, the Presumption
applies to all student loan discharge claims
or inquiries under Chapters 7,
21
11, 12 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
1. A Motivated Congress
Prior to the enactment of the BRA, there were virtually no legal

prohibitions to discharging student loans in bankruptcy. 22 At the time,
much like today, most college students received financial aid via federally

guaranteed, or subsidized, loan programs established under Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 ("Title IV" and "HEA" respectively).2 3 In

the pre-BRA era, many student-debtors were able to arbitrarily file for
bankruptcy and discharge student loan debt upon graduation because the
typical college graduate owned very few assets and had little to no income
to repay student loans.24 Armed with this knowledge and the proliferation

of reports that solvent student debtors were discharging their student loans
shortly after graduation, Congress was motivated to enact § 523(a)(8). 25
Thus, Congress enacted § 523(a)(8) in a bifurcated effort to: (1) ensure the
survival of federal student loan programs that promoted higher education

and (2) prevent abuse of bankruptcy law by seemingly solvent studentdebtors seeking arbitrary means of student loan debt forgiveness.
2. Broadening the Presumption
As enacted, the original 1978 text of § 523(a)(8) provided:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt20. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1978).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013). Granted an individual's student loan debt may be treated procedurally different under separate chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, all student loan debt is substantively treated the same because the presumption against discharge applies to all student loan discharge
claims or inquiries and it must be overcome or rebutted for a debtor to obtain student loan discharge.
22. In re Johnson, 218 B.R. at 451 ("Reports of students discharging their educational obligations
first emerged in the early 70's. Neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the provisions governing the student
loan programs specifically prohibited the discharge of student loans. Stories proliferated of students
discharging their educational obligations on the eve of lucrative careers ... the popular portrayal of the
'deadbeat' student debtor proved both compelling and enduring.").
23. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54 (1965)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq. (2013)) [hereinafter Higher Education Act]. To briefly
digress, Section 439A of the Higher Education Act prohibited the discharge of Title IV student loans in
bankruptcy unless the student loan debt was ripe for repayment for at least five years; however, the
enactment of the BRA in 1978 formally repealed § 439A, replacing it with § 523(a)(8). Compare Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 1978), with 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1978).
24. In re Johnson, 218 B.R. at 451.
25. Id.
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(8) to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of
higher education, for an educational loan, unless-,
(A) such loan first became due before five years
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents.2 6
In the years following its enactment, Congress continually broadened
or expanded § 523(a)(8), progressively limiting debtors' ability to obtain
discharge of educational loans. First, in 1979, Congress decided to correct
"the different treatment of profit-making and nonprofit institutions of
higher education under § 523(a)(8)" and exclude "deferment periods from
calculation of the repayment period" for purposes of prohibiting "debtors
from deferring payments for the non-dischargeability period. '2 7 Recognizing that for-profit institutions also issued educational loans, and not exclusively the federal government, Congress equalized the application of
§ 523(a)(8) by applying the Presumption to bankruptcy claims involving
the discharge of private, for-profit institutional student loans.2 Also, the
1979 amendment eliminated the standing possibility that, under the 1978
text of § 523(a)(8), a student-debtor could arbitrarily avoid repayment of
an educational loan for the first five years of the repayment period.2 9
Congress continued to broaden the applicable scope of § 523(a)(8).3 °
In 1984, the Presumption was expanded to apply to all loans issued for any
educationalbenefit, regardless of whether the loan was issued for the benefit of higher education or any other type of career-based education, including specialized training or trade school. 3 1 Then in 1990, Congress increased
the repayment period from five years to seven years, thus expanding the

26. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8) (codified at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1978))
(emphasis added).

27. In re Johnson, 218 BR. at 453 (citing S. REP. No. 96-230, at 1-2 (1979)).
28. Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, § 3(1), 93 Stat. 387 (1979) ("Section 523(a)(8) of title
11, United States Code, as enacted by section 101 of Public Law 95-598, is amended-(1) by striking
out 'to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educational loan' and
inserting instead 'for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or
made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of
higher education."').
29. Prior to the 1979 amendment, it was "possible for the first five years of the repayment period
on a student's loan to run without the student having an actual repayment obligation during all of that
period." S. REP. No. 96-230, at 3 (1979)).
30. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 454(a)(2), 98 Stat. 333 (1984) ("Section 523(a) of title 11 of the United States Code is amended-(2)
by striking out 'of higher education' in paragraph 8.").

31. Id.
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time period in which a debtor must wait before seeking student loan discharge in bankruptcy under § 523.32 A qualified debtor was unable to seek
discharge of educational loans in bankruptcy before such debt was "ripe,"
or repayment was due, and payments were made on the debt for at least
seven years-rather than five years.3 3

Further, discharge of private student loan debt was not subject to the
§ 523(a)(8) Presumption, making private student loans easier to discharge
in bankruptcy than federal student loans.34 But, Congress changed that in
2005. In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"), which established sweeping bankruptcy reform aimed at minimizing abuse of bankruptcy.3 5 In an effort to
minimize abuse of bankruptcy, Congress enacted BAPCPA to make it
"more difficult for people to file for bankruptcy," especially under Chapter
7.36 BAPCPA amended § 523 to include current subsections (a)(8)(A)(ii)
and (a)(8)(B); therefore, a sizeable amount of § 523(a)(8)'s current text
derives from the amendment set forth in BAPCPA. 37 Accordingly, today,
"an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit" or "any
other educational loan that is a qualified education loan"-including both
federal and private student loans-cannot be discharged in bankruptcy absent an "undue hardship" on the debtor.3 8 Thus, BAPCPA extended the
§ 523(a)(8) Presumption to apply to all private student loan discharge

claims in order to make discharge more difficult.
Since 1978, the progressive limitations placed upon student debt dis-

charge have become increasingly stringent, making it much more difficult
for a qualified debtor to obtain student loan discharge. The current text of
§ 523(a)(8) reads:
32. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(1)-(2), 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) ("Section 523(a)(8) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-(1) by striking 'for an educational' and all
that follows through "unless", and inserting the following: 'for an educational benefit overpayment or
loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole
or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received
as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless'; and (2) by amending subparagraph (A) to
read as follows: '(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more
than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the
filing of the petition."'). Under the current form of § 523(a)(8), there is no temporal limitation on
discharge of student loan debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013).
33. Id.
34. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 220, 119 Stat 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Bankruptcy Reform Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.,
1st Sess. (2005), 100-01 (opening statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley), available at http://www. gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CHRG-109shrg42675/pdf/CHRG-109shrg42675.pdf(last accessed Jan. 29, 2014) (stating
"[t]he vast majority of people believe that individuals who file for bankruptcy should be required to pay
back some of their debts if they have the means to do so. This is precisely what the bankruptcy reform
legislation does. Most people think it should be more difficult for people to file for bankruptcy. Americans have had enough; they are tired of paying for high rollers who game the current system and its
loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.") (emphasis added).
37. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)-(B) (2013), with BAPCPA,supra note 34, at § 220.
38. Id.
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(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),
or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents, for(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan
made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental
unit, or made under any program funded in whole
or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified
education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a
debtor who is an individual.3 9
So, comparing the 1978 text and current text of § 523(a)(8), it is clearly
evident that the Presumption has been broadened over the last three decades. Ultimately, the Presumption fortifies the wall Congress intended to
place between student-debtors and bankruptcy discharge so as to prevent
abuse of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, it is possible for qualified debtors to
successfully overcome the wall created by Congress by rebutting the
Presumption.
B.

Rebutting the Presumption

The Presumption is rebuttable. However, rebutting the Presumption
is arduous because a qualified debtor must prove40 that he or she would
suffer an "undue hardship" but for the discharge of his or her student loan
debt ("undue hardship exception"). 4 1 Accordingly, it may be said that the
undue hardship exception itself creates an undue hardship on qualified
debtors to obtain bankruptcy relief from student loan debt.
In 1997, Congress established another Commission ("1997 Commission") to review bankruptcy laws and recommend reform. 42 The 1997
39. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013) (emphasis added).
40. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 271 B.R. 322, 328 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002)
("The debtor has the burden of proving undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence.").
41. The Presumption's undue hardship exception is expressed with the language: "A discharge
under ... this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- (a) unless excepting such
debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor .
11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
42. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4197,
4147 (1994).
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Commission documented problems associated with the taxing Presumption
and undue hardship exception, and in a bold and semi-radical fashion, the
1997 Commission recommended that Congress eliminate § 523(a)(8) altogether "so that most student loans are treated like all other unsecured
debts. In so doing, the dischargeability provisions would be consistent with
federal policy to encourage educational endeavors. '43 The 1997 Commission acknowledged that the burden placed on qualified debtors contradicted the underlying policy of promoting affordable higher education
through available federal loan programs under Title IV of the HEA.44 If
Congress were to erase § 523(a)(8) from the Bankruptcy Code, the 1997
Commission explained, "Litigation over 'undue hardship' would be eliminated, so that the discharge of student loans no longer would be denied to
those who need it most."'45 Thus, the 1997 Commission highlighted two
damning aspects of § 523(a)(8)'s undue hardship exception: that it (1) fostered costly litigation resulting from a lack of defined language and (2)
denied relief to those who were entitled to receive discharge. Nevertheless,
Congress was not swayed by the 1997 Commission's rationale and recomand its undue hardmendation because both the § 523(a)(8) Presumption
46
ship exception remain very much intact today.
The Presumption's undue hardship exception was instilled at the
BRA's inception in' 48 1978.4 7 But, Congress did not (and has yet to) define
"undue hardship.
Instead, without clear congressional guidance, the
courts are charged to define "undue hardship" themselves. 49 As a result of
vast litigation resulting from the "undue hardship" ambiguity, there was a
necessitous demand for a stable gauge to assess § 523(a)(8) discharge
claims-so a test was created.
1. The Brunner Test
Since 1978, the federal circuits have created a variety of court-specific
assessment measures for § 523(a)(8) discharge claims, resulting in an inconsistent standard. 50 Emerging from the mire of inconsistency, the Brunner51
43. Johnson v. Mo. Baptist Coll. (In re Johnson), 218 B.R. 449, 454 (1998) (citing REP. OF THE
NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, § 1.4.5 (Oct. 20, 1997)).

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013).
47. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8) (codified at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)
(1978)).
48. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 271 B.R. 322, 554 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002)
("The Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase ["undue hardship"] and courts have struggled with
its meaning.").
49. Id. ("A divergent body of appellate authority has attempted to unwrap the 'undue hardship'
enigma.").
50. Id.
51. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987),
affg 46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1985).
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test has become the prominent benchmark for determining "undue hardship" under § 523(a)(8).5 2 The Brunner test offers a three-part analysis,

which requires a showing:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that
additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.53
Simply looking at Brunner's text, "undue hardship" may be taken to mean
that a debtor's present income is grossly inadequate to pay his or her student loans, and such an inability is very likely to remain even after considering the debtor's future earning potential.5 4
The first prong of Brunner sets forth a "but for" standard of proof
whereby a debtor must demonstrate that his or her current unfortunate
financial situation, and corresponding lifestyle, will worsen but for discharge of the debtor's student loan debt. This requirement is seemingly
redundant because a qualified insolvent debtor will indubiously incur further financial hardship if forced to perform an ongoing obligation such as
making student loan payments. Additionally, the embedded requirement
that a debtor's lifestyle fall below a "minimal standard" of living may be
52. The Brunner test, first articulated by the Second Circuit, has been generally followed by a
vast majority of federal circuits, namely the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 300 (3d
Cir. 1995); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005);
U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); Cheesman v. Tenn.
Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1994) (The Sixth Circuit did not
formally adopt the Brunner test, but substantively employed merely a restated form of the test, see
Dolph v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Dolph), 215 B.R. 832, 836 (6th Cir. BAP, 1998));
In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993); United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In re Pena), 155
F.3d 1108, 1111 at n. 3 (9th Cir. 1998); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th
Cir. 2004); Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003). On the
other end of the spectrum, the Eighth Circuit established and applies a less-restrictive "totality of the
circumstances test," requiring the court to consider "(1) the debtor's past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) the debtor's and her dependents' reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy
case." In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554. Last, the First Circuit has not adopted any particular test. Nash v.
Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[T]here has been much
attention given to the particular test which should be applied to determine 'undue hardship.' Congress
did not attempt to give specific guidance. We as a circuit have not had occasion to declare our views...
We see no need in this case to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identifying a case of
'undue hardship.'"). In fact, courts in First Circuit have applied both tests to a given case. See, e.g.,
Stevenson v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Stevenson), 463 B.R. 586, 596 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011)
("Regardless of whether this Court applies the Brunner test or the 'totality of the circumstances test,'
the Court concludes that Ms. Stevenson failed to satisfy her burden of establishing undue hardship as of
the time of trial."), aff'd, 475 B.R. 286 (D. Mass. 2012).
53. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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seen as ambiguous. 6 There is no clear legislative standard under § 523 for
assessing whether a debtor's lifestyle conforms to a minimal standard of
living.57 Nevertheless, the first prong appears to disregard the Bankruptcy
Code's purpose for discharging or severing existing obligations as a primary means of financial rehabilitation or a fresh financial start.
Further, the Brunner analysis suggests the second prong is an extension of the first prong.58 Under the second prong, a debtor's substandard
lifestyle stemming from financial insolvency must be likely to persist for a
substantial part of the repayment period. 9 Consequently, the second
prong is not present-fact determinative like the first and third prongs, making it a more difficult element to satisfy because it requires a debtor to
convince the court that there exists a future "certainty of [financial] hopelessness."6 ° This "certainty of hopelessness" element requires the debtor to
predict his or her future financial well-being, and to show that there will be
a definite inability to repay the student loan debt.6" Accordingly, "undue
hardship" requires "more than temporary, severe financial difficulty."62
Thus, the Brunner test adds some clarity to the ambiguous definition of
"undue hardship," but its crystal-ball analysis also adds a heightened level
of difficulty to the burden of rebutting the Presumption.
Last, Brunner's third prong requires that the debtor has made prepetition "good faith" efforts to repay his or her student loans.6 3 Unlike the
second prong, Brunner's "good faith" element requires a present-fact determinative inquiry regarding the debtor's financial goodwill.64 Under the
third prong, "[g]ood faith is measured by the debtor's efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses,, 65 and "[c]ourts will
also consider a debtor's effort-or lack thereof-to negotiate a repayment
plan, although a history of making or not making payments is, by itself, not
dispositive. ' '6 6 This seems to be a straightforward inquiry-either the

debtor did or did not make good faith efforts to repay. But, Brunner's
"good faith" prong, as well as the entire Brunner analysis, has garnered
recent criticism and seemingly has fostered judicial activism.

56. Id.
57. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2013).
58. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
59. Id.
60. Tirch v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir.
2005) (citing Olyer v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)),
61. Id.
62. Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship, 185 ED.
LAW REP. 783, 798 (2004).
63. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
64. Id.
65. Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst. Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Penn. Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 499 (9th Cir. BAP 2002)).
66. Id. (citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 882 (9th Cir.
2006)).
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Recent Brunner Criticism

Two recent cases, both addressing Brunner'sthird prong, may be seen
to judicially cushion the harsh legal standard presented in Brunner, favoring discharge of student debt rather than restricting it. 7 In the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Krieger, Judge Easterbrook suggested that Brunner's
interpretation of § 523(a)(8)'s "undue hardship" language is nothing more
than "judicial gloss" that "supersede[s] the statute itself."6
In Krieger, a "destitute" 53-year old debtor declared bankruptcy and
sought to discharge her student loan debt under § 523(a)(8).69 The debtor
was unemployed since 1986 and did not fit the job market's employable
mold.7" The district court held that the debtor did not satisfy Brunner's
"good faith" element because she "could have searched harder for work[,]"
and "the judge also thought that Krieger [the debtor] fail[ed] the goodfaith standard, because she had not enrolled in a program that would have
offered her a 25-year payment schedule.""1 Yet, the "district judge and
Educational Credit [the defendant] concede[d] that the result of a 25-year
payment plan probably would be no payments, with interest accumulating,
followed by forgiveness when Krieger reache[d] age 78.''T2
In the Seventh Circuit's opinion, Judge Easterbrook reasoned "the
[district court] judge concluded that good faith entails commitment to future efforts to repay. Yet, if this is so, no educational loan ever could be
discharged, because it is always possible to pay in the future should prospects improve. '7 3 Noting this paradoxical interpretation, the Seventh Circuit held the "thought that debtors always must agree to a payment plan
and forgo a discharge [so as to satisfy Brunner's "good faith" prong] ...is
an [incorrect] proposition of law.",74 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit
permitted Krieger to discharge her student loan debt under § 523(a)(8).7 5
Hence, under the Seventh Circuit's rationale and opinion, a qualified
debtor need not even attempt to repay student loan debt-for instance,
through an established repayment plan-to satisfy Brunner'sgood-faith element. If correct, this interpretation and application dulls the teeth of
§ 523(a)(8)'s Presumption by abating the burden required to satisfy the undue hardship exception.
Likewise in Roth, a 67-year old debtor plagued by unemployment and
numerous chronic medical ailments filed for bankruptcy and requested a
67. Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2013); Roth v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).
68. Krieger, 713 F.3d at 884.
69. Id. at 883.
70. Id. at 884.
71. Id. at 883.
72. Id. at 884-85.
73. Id. at 884.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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discharge of student loan debt on grounds of undue hardship.7 6 The Ninth

Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that the debtor satisfied the "good
faith" element despite failing to participate in an income-based repayment
plan and not making a single voluntary payment on her student loans.7 7
Further, the Roth concurrence by Judge Pappas firmly asserted that Brunner was outdated and should be replaced by a more common sense understanding of "undue hardship., 78 Judge Pappas opined that Brunner's

framework "no longer reflects reality" and is "too narrow" because it creates an unconscionable burden for debtors to satisfy.79 Judge Pappas
stated:

[E]mploying an undue hardship discharge test that requires
those who cannot repay educational loans, most of which
are government-backed, to attempt to do so creates
problems for all .... Congress . . . presumably intended

that bankruptcy courts have the flexibility to make factbased decisions in individual cases about the need for student loan debt relief .... Brunner restricts the bankruptcy

courts' ability to do so, and its application in the Ninth Circuit should be reconsidered.80
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits' recognizably lenient approach in applying Brunner to student loan discharge claims, specifically the "good
faith" element, and Judge Pappas's concurrence in Roth suggests that congressional action should be taken to redefine "undue hardship" in a more
reasonable fashion than that offered in Brunner.8 1 If Congress is unwilling

or unable to do so, recent action taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
76. In re Roth, 490 BR. at 912. The Roth court provided: "Debtor suffers from several chronic
medical conditions including a thyroid condition, diabetes, macular degeneration, cataracts, high cholesterol, and depression. Some of her medical conditions required surgery. Debtor has also incurred
serious shoulder, knee, and wrist injuries that have limited her activities. All of her medical ills necessitate many medical appointments, which in some instances have precluded eligibility for new employment. Although hampered by her ailments, Debtor feels she is not totally disabled from working unless
her 'sight goes and ...[she] can't read ....From July 2009 to January 2011, Debtor applied unsuccessfully for over 280 federal jobs, She concentrated on this employment sector, because she had previously been a federal employee and believed she had preferential rehiring rights. She also applied for
non-federal positions. She testified that she's worked for forty-five years and wanted to find a job,
although it would only be justified to do so if it paid above minimum wage. She further testified that if
her discharge was denied, she might either enroll in the income-based repayment plan discussed below,
or remain unemployed."
77. Id. at 917-18.
78. Id. at 920-23 (J. Pappas, concurring).
79. Id. at 920 (J. Pappas, concurring).
80. Id. at 923 (J. Pappas, concurring).
81. There is a plethora of articles and other works on the matter of redefining and even eliminating "undue hardship" under § 523(a)(8). Though the Author agrees that "undue hardship" needs to be
judicially redefined or legislatively defined, this Comment does not seek to address the issue, but
merely to recognize it. However, a recent article offers valuable insight on the matter. See generally
George M. Bedinger, Time for a Fresh Look at the "Undue Hardship" Bankruptcy Standardfor Student
Debtors, IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2256197 (last accessed Dec. 21, 2013).
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illustrates that the courts possess a willingness to toe the line that separates

the judiciary from the legislature to bring about a more reasonable definition of "undue hardship" under § 523(a)(8).
3.

The "Undue Hardship" Myth

Judicial activism aside, in context of the Brunner test and § 523(a)(8)'s
undue hardship exception, there is pedagogic disagreement as to whether
the burden is actually difficult to satisfy. Some scholars have asserted that
the undue hardship exception does not present a difficult burden to satisfy. 8 2 In particular, Jason Juliano proposes that the lore surrounding the
undue hardship exception, and not the legal standard itself, actually discourages qualified persons from even attempting to discharge their student
loan debt in bankruptcy.8 3 luliano contends that qualified persons are psychologically deterred from seeking student loan discharge because of the
well-renowned "myth" that the undue hardship exception burden is very

difficult to satisfy, detracting from the understanding of the actual standard
presented in § 523(a)(8). 84 However, the National Consumer Law Center
emphatically refutes the existence of such a "myth" and steadily affirms
that the rigors presented by the under hardship exception are, in fact, real
and prevalent.8 5
82. See generally Jason luliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the
Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012). In his article's prologue, Jason luliano
asserts: "For years, academics have argued that the undue hardship standard for discharging student
loans in bankruptcy is both unduly burdensome and applied in an inconsistent manner. By reviewing a
nationwide sample of student loan bankruptcy disputes, this study shows that neither criticism is warranted. First, judges grant a hardship discharge to nearly forty percent of the debtors who seek one.
Second, successful debtors differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in three important respects.
They are (1) less likely to be employed, (2) more likely to have a medical hardship, and (3) more likely
to have lower annual incomes the year before they filed for bankruptcy. The real failing of the student
loan discharge process is lack of participation by those in need. Incredibly, only 0.1 percent of student
loan debtors who have filed for bankruptcy attempt to discharge their student loans. That statistic is
even more surprising in light of this article's finding that a debtor does not need to hire an attorney to
be successful. In fact, debtors without attorneys were just as likely to receive hardship discharges of
their student loan debt as were those debtors who had counsel. Ultimately, the low rate at which
debtors request hardship discharges shows that, although the system is broken, many of its flaws stem
from a failing not previously discussed in the literature."
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. National Consumer Law Center, The Truth About Student Loans and the Undue Hardship
Discharge (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/
2007/03/iuliano response.pdf (last accessed Dec. 21, 2013). In response to luliano's article, the NCLC
asserts: "The luliano study claims that many more debtors would get student loan discharges if they
simply sought them. This finding is based on a comparison of the financial characteristics of the 213
debtors in the sample with those of the assumed 169,557 debtors having student loans with one of the
ten largest lenders who filed bankruptcy cases in 2007 and did not seek a discharge (the 'non-discharge
seekers'). The 169,557 figure was not derived by conducting a similar PACER search of all bankruptcy
cases filed in 2007 in which one of the ten largest lenders is listed as a creditor. Instead it was assumed
that 71.2 percent of debtors with student loans in 2007 bankruptcy cases (based the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data) had loans with the ten largest lenders because that represents these creditors market share. This is a questionable assumption not based on sound statistical methodology. It is quite
conceivable that debtors with student loans held by these creditors do not file bankruptcy with the same
frequency as debtors having loans with other, smaller creditors. In fact, some lower-income debtors
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In the end, garden-variety financial hardship is clearly inadequate to
satisfy the requirements under the Brunner test for discharging student
debt on grounds of "undue hardship." While the Brunner test is not the
perfect assessment, it does reinforce the stiff burden unfortunate studentdebtors must overcome to successfully discharge their student loan debt.
Given the latent statutory ambiguity regarding the Presumption's undue
hardship exception, the fact remains that defining "undue hardship" is a
challenge that courts, like the Second Circuit in Brunner, have been compelled to undertake. Nonetheless, recent rulings in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have cushioned the burden attached to the undue hardship exception, further illustrating that courts recognize the acrimonious prerequisite
required to discharge student loan debt under § 523(a)(8).
C. Proposed Legislation
Within the last few years, § 523(a)(8) has become a fixture for congressional attention. Some lawmakers have sought to revise § 523(a)(8) and its
Presumption, while others seek to abolish it. For example, more recently,
two proposed bills before Congress would either directly or indirectly create a more reasonable standard for student loan discharge under
§ 523(a)(8), or do away with it altogether. The Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013 and the Student Loan Borrowers' Bill of Rights Act of
2013 represent proposed legislation that would directly impact student loan
discharge claims.8 6
1. The Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013
The Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013 ("FSSA"), sponsored
by Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, 7 was introduced on the Senate floor
and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 23, 2013.8 If
enacted, this bill would re-write § 523(a)(8) to read:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),
or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debtwith student loans for attendance at for-profit schools may have been more likely to have filed bankruptcy for reasons not related to the student loans, and their loans may not have been held by one of
the ten largest lenders."
86. See Charles Tabb, Senator Richard Durbin Discusses the "Student Loan Borrower Bill of
Rights" (Feb. 11, 2014), American Bankruptcy Institute, Podcast 144, available at http://news.abi.org/
(last accessed
podcasts/144-senator-richard-durbin-discusses-the-student-loan-borrower-bill-of-rights
Feb. 19, 2014) ("Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), the Assistant Majority Leader for the Senate and sponsor of
S.1803, the 'Student Loan Borrower Bill of Rights,' joins ABI Resident Scholar Prof. Charles Tabb for a
discussion on key issues surrounding student debt. In addition to an overview and insight into his
legislation, Durbin provides his thoughts on the risks to the U.S. if action is not taken to address the
student debt crisis.").
87. In recent years, Senator Richard "Dick" Durbin (D-Ill.) has been one of the foremost advocates of bankruptcy reform in Congress, as he has sponsored a multitude of bankruptcy-related
legislation.
88. GovTrack, S. 114: Fairnessfor Struggling Students Act of 2013, available at https://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/113/s114 (last accessed Feb. 18, 2014).
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(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under
this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents, for an educational
benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or an
obligation to repay funds received from a governmental
unit as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.8 9
Given this proposed language, the FSSA would eliminate the amendments made to § 523(a)(8) by BAPCPA in 2005. 90 Under the FSSA,
§ 523(a)(8) would not apply to the discharge of any private, nonfederal student loan debt.9 1 Consequently, debtors' claims seeking to discharge private student loans would bypass the Presumption, and private student loan
debt would be systematically dischargeable in bankruptcy.9 2 Thus, the essential purpose of the FSSA is to treat private student loan debt in the
same manner as all other private consumer debt in bankruptcy. 93 However, the bill's enactment is highly improbable. 94
2.

Student Loan Borrowers' Bill of Rights Act of 2013

Although aimed at addressing a more comprehensive problem than
the burden presented under § 523(a)(8), 95 the Student Loan Borrowers'
Bill of Rights Act of 2013 ("SLBBRA") deliberately seeks to abolish the
§ 523(a)(8) Presumption. 96 The SLBBRA was introduced on January 15,
89. S. 114, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (2013) (as introduced on Jan. 23, 2014) (emphasis added), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113sll4is/pdf/BILLS- 113sl14is.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29,
2014) (emphasis added) [hereinafter FSSA]; compare id., with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013).
90. Compare FSSA, supra note 89, with BAPCPA, supra note 34, at § 220.
91. See generally FSSA, supra note 89.
92. Id. With regard to legislative action involving § 523(a)(8), the Author agrees more with this
measure than any other proposed legislation insofar as it addresses current issues explained in Section
III of this Comment. See infra Section III. Allowing the presumptive discharge of private student loan
debt, while maintaining heightened scrutiny for discharge of federal student loans, is a great idea. But
simply permitting discharge without something more would only serve to address one problem (the
student debt crisis), while ignoring another problem (needed reform of the postsecondary for-profit
industry). As this Comment proposes, there is a way to kill two birds with one stone-to address the
student debt crisis and subtly reform the postsecondary for-profit industry. See infra Section IV.
93. Id.
94. See GovTrack, supra note 88 (illustrating that the bill has been designated a 10% chance of
receiving committee approval and a 1% chance of enactment).
95. Though the Student Loan Borrowers' Bill of Rights Act of 2013 does not seek to directly
address the problematic burden under § 523(a), but rather directly addresses the student debt crisis and
student borrower ignorance of available means of repayment, the bill's proposed amendments will have
a substantial effect on § 523(a)(8) and the burden required for student loan discharge. See infra Section
III(A)(1).
96. H.R. 3892, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. I, § 101 (2014) (as introduced on Jan. 15, 2014), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-1l3hr3892ihpdf/BILLS-113hr3892ih.pdf (last accessed Feb. 18,
2014).
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2014, and is currently before several congressional committees awaiting ap-

proval.97 The underlying purpose of the bill is "[t]o establish student loan
borrowers' rights to basic consumer protections, reasonable and flexible
repayment options, access to earned credentials, and effective loan cancellation in exchange for public service .
9....
8 The bill attempts to achieve
this purpose, in part, by amending §523 of the Bankruptcy Code.99 In one
of the very first sections of the bill, the SLBBRA proposes that:
Section 523(a) of title 11 of the United States Code is
amended-

(1) by striking paragraph (8); and
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (19) as
paragraphs (8) through (18).100
Accordingly, the bill would completely remove the Presumption and
the burdensome undue hardship exception. And if enacted, barring any
other law to the contrary, all student loans (both federal and private)

would be presumptively dischargeable in bankruptcy; or at the very least,
student loan discharge would not be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny
than discharge of other common forms of consumer debt.1 ' But, the SLBBRA has virtually no chance of being enacted.10 2
Overall, § 523(a)(8) presents a difficult standard for discharging student loans in bankruptcy. This standard has received ample legislative, judicial, and academic attention. The § 523(a)(8) Presumption and undue
hardship exception to it present a discernible legal quandary worth congressional attention and scholastic discussion. However, there are other
emerging issues of public concern regarding the current student debt crisis
and needed reform of the postsecondary for-profit industry that deserve
equal attention, if not more.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. The Author does not fully agree with this proposed legislation. Permitting the presumptive
discharge of federal student loans, without heightened scrutiny, would be a mistake because there would
be little incentive for student debtors to make reasonable efforts to repay their student loans. Consequently, a bill proposing to permit the presumptive discharge of federal student loans would likely open
legal avenues for abuse of bankruptcy, whereby seemingly solvent student debtors could arbitrarily
discharge this debt. And this adverse consequence is something that should be prevented at all reasonable costs. Also, American taxpayers, collectively, would bear the risk and costs if all federal and
government-backed student loans were effortless to discharge. In essence, if enacted, this bill would
likely foster negative public policy and legal implications. Congress contemplated these implications
and addressed them when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and consequently first enacted § 523(a)(8). See supra Section II(A)(1). Ultimately, discharge of federal or government-backed
student loans should be subject to stricter scrutiny. On the other hand, private student loans should be
presumptively dischargeable in bankruptcy for reasons briefly stated earlier and to be discussed later in
this Comment. See infra Section IV.
102. GovTrack, H.R. 3892: Student Loan Borrowers' Bill of Rights Act of 2013, available at https://
www. govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3892 (last accessed Feb. 18, 2014) (illustrating that the bill has
been designated zero chance of receiving committee approval).
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III.

EMERGING PROBLEMS AND CURRENT MEASURES TAKEN
TO ADDRESS THEM

Variables such as the current student debt crisis and dilemma regarding the deficiencies of for-profit institutions or colleges within the higher
education system have warranted a call for stricter regulations in higher
education. However, amending the Bankruptcy Code may be a better approach-though an unorthodox one-to correct the inequitable intrusion
of for-profit colleges, and subsequently alleviate harmful effects stemming
from the growing student debt crisis. Students, specifically current and former students attending for-profit institutions, are exposed to grave financial and occupational risks that are often outside their control.1 0 3 Forprofit colleges are raking in profits from federal loan programs without
being held accountable for the deficient educational services they offer to
the most vulnerable student demographic. Strategically amending
§ 523(a)(8) under the Bankruptcy Code may provide a mechanism for insolvent for-profit student-debtors to free themselves from overwhelming
private student loan debt, as well as centrally address the aggregate of social concerns comprised of the stringent § 523(a)(8) student loan discharge
exception, ever-growing student debt crisis, and needed reform of the postsecondary for-profit industry ("for-profit industry").
A.

The Ever-Gaping Wound

The prosaic assertion that a college education is both "expensive" and
an "investment" does not begin to describe the true cost and risk. A common investment calls for an individual to spend money to make money, or
in many cases, lose money. The extent of the effort in making an ordinary
financial investment is merely having the money to invest or lose. However, more than money is spent, or lost, on a college education. Unlike that
of an ordinary investment, the extent of the effort in making an educational
investment is the time, energy, and the proverbial blood, sweat, and tears a
student sacrifices to make his or her return on investment worthwhile.
Moreover, with respect to an educational investment, the initial investment of tens of thousands of dollars or more, which many prospective college students do not have to invest, is only the beginning. Generally, a
prospective college student must first borrow money before any time can
be spent, energy can be exhausted, or tears can be shed. In the United
States, given the unavoidable debt-driven practice of investing in higher
education, undergraduate and graduate students often incur exorbitant
amounts of debt stemming from student loan borrowing. Immense borrowing, mixed with economic and employment stagnation, has broken the
skin of many student borrowers and has given rise to a crisis in our country.
103. See generally Chadwick Matlin, The Reform of For-ProfitColleges: Can They Give Up Their
Predatory Ways, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 20, 2013, http://www.theatIantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/
the-reform-of-for-profit-colleges-can-they-give-up-their-predatry-ways/279850/.
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Considering these variables and the inequitable intrusion of for-profit colleges into the higher education arena, the ever-gaping wound known as the
student debt crisis continues to grow.
1. The Student Debt Crisis
College is supposedly the best years of a young adult's life. It can also
be the most expensive years of their life. For the last sixty years, millions of
college students have borrowed to pay for their education. The United
States federal government has been, and is, the biggest lender of student
loans. Congress established several federally-guaranteed, student loan programs when it enacted the Higher Education Act of 1965.1' As a result,
federal student loans are available to virtually every student pursuing a
postsecondary education or specialized career training. In fact, as of the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013, "students borrowed approximately $106
billion through federal loan programs" alone. 105 These numbers are worrisome because they represent the rising costs in education, as well as add to
the already staggering amount of outstanding student debt owed by the upand-coming generation. Consequently, our country is amidst a student
debt crisis.
"Student loan debt is the only form of consumer debt that has grown

since the peak of consumer debt in 2008," and it continued to rise throughout the Great Recession of 2008-2009.106 By the end of 2012, the average
balance on a student loan was 24,803 dollars.' 0 7 And as of May 2013, the

amount of student loan debt exceeded one trillion dollars according to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 10 8 At the end of 2013, outstanding
104. See Higher Education Act, supra note 23. The purpose of this Act was "[t]o strengthen the
educational resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in
postsecondary and higher education" and it established the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, which
was a precursor to the current Stafford Loan Program established under Title IV of the Act. See id.; 79
Stat. at 1219. Today, Title IV federal student aid programs generally encompass Stafford, Parent Plus,
Graduate Plus, and Federal Perkins Loans Programs, as well as the Pell Grant Program. See infra note
124. In general, these programs have been touted as avenues of access to higher education or career
training for those who cannot fiscally out-right afford a college or postsecondary education.
105. Federal Education Budget Project, FederalStudent Loan Default Rates, New America Foundation (Nov. 21, 2013), available at http://febp.newamerica.netbackground-analysis/federal-studentloan-default-rates (last accessed Dec. 20, 2013).
106. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Student Loan Debt by Age Group (Mar. 29, 2013), http:/
/www.newyorkfed.org/studentloandebt/ (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
107. Id.
108. Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/studentdebt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/ (last accessed Dec. 20, 2013). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, commonly known as the "Dodd-Frank Act," established
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). See generally United States Senate, Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act, available at http://www.banking.senate
.gov/publicfiles/070110 Dodd_FrankWall_StreetReform-comprehensive-summaryFinal.pdf (last
accessed Dec. 29, 2013). In general, the CFPB is a federal oversight authority on all things consumer
financial, from enforcement of federal consumer financial protection laws to researching consumer behavior and patterns. See id.
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student loan balances were at 1.08 trillion dollars, while the ninety-day delinquency rate on repayment of student loans approached 12%.109 To put
these figures in perspective, federal student loan debt has surpassed consumer credit card and auto loan debt to become the second largest form of
consumer debt, trailing only mortgage debt." 0 In a sense, paper has sur-

passed plastic. More money is owed on an average college degree than on
consumer credit cards. Considering consumers' habitual swiping of credit
cards to finance everyday life, the status of student debt in our country is

confounding-and potentially disastrous.
In addition, student-debtors are simply not repaying their outstanding
loans."' About one in seven student-debtors has defaulted on student
loans. 1' 2 Generally, default occurs when a student-debtor fails to make

payments on student debt for more than 270 days.' 1 3 From 2010 to the
2012, 600,000 of the nearly four million student-debtors who entered the
repayment period defaulted on their student loans." 4 More so, for many
student-debtors, default is the preponderant method of coping with the rigors of repaying student loans because "[a]lmost all student debt is difficult,
if not impossible, to refinance-sticking borrowers [student-debtors] with
high rates in a low-rate environment and adding to the economic drag.""' 5

109. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research and Statistics Group, Quarterly Report on
Household Debt and Credit: February 2014, http://www.newyorkfed.org/householdcredit/2013-Q4/
HHDC_ 2013 Q4.pdf (last accessed Feb. 21, 2014) ("About 11.5% of student loan balances are 90+
days delinquent or in default.").
110. Id. at 3. The Report graphically represents that student loan debt comprises 9%, while credit
card debt comprises 6% and auto loan debt comprises 7%, of the total consumer debt of 11.52 trillion
dollars as of Q4 2013.
111. United States Department of Education, Default Rates Continue to Rise for FederalStudent
Loans, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/default-rates-continue-rise-federal-student-loans (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
112. John Hechinger and Janet Lorin, Student-Loan Defaults Rise in U.S. as Borrowers Struggle,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-09-30/student-loan-defaultsrise-in-u-s-as-borrowers-struggle-1-.html.
113. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What does it mean to "default" on my federal student
loans?, Jul. 30, 2013, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/649/what-does-it-mean-default-my-federal-student-loans.html (last accessed Dec. 20, 2013). Default differs from delinquency, though the
terms are often confused. Delinquency refers to the period of non-payment preceding default. Unlike
delinquency, the repercussions of default can be dire. Debt collection ensues shortly after entering
default, triggering a devastating effect on a student debtor's credit. In addition, high default interest
rates generally attach to the student loan and the debtor's employment income may be garnished. And
though reserved for extreme circumstances, a debtor in default may even face a criminal lawsuit instituted by the Department of Justice.
114. Allie Bidwell, Student Loan Default Rates Rise for Sixth Year: New data show more than
600,000 borrowershave defaulted on their loans in the last few years, U.S. NEws, Oct. 1, 2013, http://www
.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/01/student-loan-default-rates-rise-for-sixth-yearf.
Bidwell asserts
that "[tihe number of borrowers who defaulted on their student loans two and three years after entering repayment have continued to increase in the last several years." Id.
115. Dan Kadlec, Student Loans Are Becoming a Drag on the US Economy: The CFPB'sstudent
loan ombudsman drawsparallels with mortgage crisis andsays student debt is hurting the housing market
and the economy, TIME, Oct. 18, 2013, http:/fbusiness.time.com12013/10/18/student-loan-are-becominga-drag-on-the-us-economy/.
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Not to mention,
student loans are presumptively nondischargeable in
16
bankruptcy.
The impact of compounding student debt and steady student loan default is widespread today, and will be even more so in the near future.
These economic variables- rising student debt and steady default-have
arguably affected the housing market recovery and struggling economy on
the whole.117 In fact, some analysts have likened the current student debt
crisis to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis.1 1 8 As a result of the "economic
drag" student debt has caused to the United States economy, three questions arise:
(1) Are our students, and their outstanding debt, too big to fail?
(2) Will the "student debt bubble" be the next to burst?
(3) Will the federal government bail out students?
The economically precarious amount of outstanding student debt undoubtedly presents many problems today. If current trends prevail, more
potentially cataclysmic economic complications will imminently follow.
Our students, more specifically our nation's up-and-coming generation, are
too big to fail, which may call for another government bail out in the near
future. Notably, among this indebted student demographic are for-profit
students. And several postsecondary, for-profit institutions have inequitably exacerbated the student debt crisis.
2.

For-Profit Colleges

For-profit institutions or colleges ("FPCs") have become a major dynamic within the United States postsecondary education industry." 9 FPCs,
also known as proprietary institutions12 0 or career colleges, may simply be
characterized as postsecondary educational institutions that are owned and
operated by private organizations and corporations; some of the larger
FPCs are publicly-held corporations.1 21 These institutions are conceptually
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2013); see supra Section II (discussing the § 523(a)(8)
Presumption).
117. Kadlec, supra note 115.
118. Jonathan B. Glowacki and Leighton A. Hunley, The Student Loan Debt Crisis in Perspective
(June 20, 2012), http://www.milliman.com/insight/insurance/The-student-loan-debt-crisis-in-perspective/
(last accessed Dec. 30, 2013).
119. Given the limited data on the for-profit industry and multitude of for-profit institutions
within the United States higher education system, providing specific data about these institutions would
be an improbable task within the text of a legal comment. To be clear, all for-profit colleges are not the
same, though there are specific trends among the for-profit industry. Thus, most of the foregoing text
presents generalizations regarding the for-profit industry on the whole, despite the continuing reference
to "FPCs."
120. See 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2013) (defining "proprietary institution of higher education" under
the Education Code).
121. See United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, For Profit
Higher Education: The Failure to Safeguard the FederalInvestment and Ensure Student Success, Part II,
272 (July 30, 2012), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for-profit report/Contents.pdf
(last accessed Dec. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Senate HELP Report 2012]. Examples of large and commonly known FPCs include: (1) Apollo Group, Inc., (2) DeVry, Inc., (3) ITT Educational Services, Inc.,
and (4) Strayer Education, Inc.
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similar to community colleges because FPCs are often small, local institu-

tions that cater primarily to nontraditional students. In addition, FPCs traditionally offer academic and nonacademic curricula, ranging from
numerous specialized training programs-such as automotive technology

programs, culinary specialist training, and beauty technician programs-to
doctorate programs. Further, these institutions have been around for some
time, at least since the latter part of the nineteenth century. 2 FPCs began
to prosper in the early 1970s when demand for higher education increased
due to new legislation granting these institutions Title IV'2 3 eligibility to
receive more federal student aid revenue. This legislation opened the
floodgates through which numerous students have since poured into these

institutions.
Today, during any given academic year, federal law permits an FPC to

amass 90% of its total revenue from federal sources such as Title IV 124
student loans, while the other 10% must derive from nonfederal sources
such as private and institutional student loan revenue ("90/10-rule"). a25
Sanctions may be imposed if a FPC's revenue ratio does not conform to the
90/10-rule.12 6 These sanctions typically consist of decreasing the amount of
Title IV federal funds an FPC may receive for a set time period, or in extreme cases, sanctions could constitute complete and permanent revocation
of Title IV eligibility. 127 Even so, many FPCs take advantage of this
favorable, statutorily permissible revenue ratio and "rely on federal fund-

ing for their continued existence. ' 12 8 "[M]ore than a third of all proprietary schools (36 percent) derived at least 80 percent of their revenue from

122. Joseph Sipley, Comment, For-ProfitEducation and FederalFunding: Bad Outcomes for Students and Taxpayers, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 267, 272-74 (2011).
123. When the Higher Education Act of 1965 was reauthorized in 1972, Congress increased appropriations of federal student loan revenue available to the for-profit industry under Title IV of the
Act. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 462(d), 86 Stat. 235, 274.
124. Today, "Title IV" revenue primarily derives from federally-backed or subsidized, or unsubsidized, federal loan programs such as Stafford, Parent Plus, Graduate Plus, and Federal Perkins Loan
Programs, and the Federal Pell Grant Program, all of which were reauthorized under Title IV of the
Higher Education Act in 1992. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, tit. IV, pts. A-E, Pub. L. No.
102-325, §§ 401-468, 106 Stat. 448.
125. The 1998 Amendments to the Higher Education Act established the 90/10-rule. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 102(b)(1)(F), 112 Stat. 1581 (1998). Consequently,
the 90/10-rule is codified in the Higher Education Act. Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1094
(a)(24), (d) (2013). In addition, there are ample regulations to enforce the 90/10-rule. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 668.14(b)(16) (2013) ("For a proprietary institution, the institution will derive at least 10 percent of its
revenues for each fiscal year from sources other than Title IV, HEA program funds, as provided in
§ 668.28(a) and (b), or be subject to sanctions described in § 668.28(c)."); see also 34 C.F.R. § 668.28(a)(b) (2013) (providing a calculable formula for determining 90/10-rule compliance).
126. 34 C.F.R. § 668.28(c) (2013).
127. Judah Bellin, The Unacknowledged Value of For-ProfitEducation, Manhattan Institution for
Policy Research, Issue Brief No. 20, 4 (Apr. 2013), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdflib_20.pdf
(last accessed Jan. 15, 2014).
128. Id.
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Title IV programs. ' 1 29 Consequently, the federal taxpayer bears an overwhelming majority of the risk in federal lending to fund higher education at
30
FPCs.1
Further, over the last twenty years, enrollment at FPCs has increased
by an astronomical 225%.131 The reason for this spike in attendance is
likely correlative to the fact that FPCs tend to be more attractive to primarily nontraditional college students looking for a more convenient education. However, the high cost of attendance, often deficient education
offered, and alleged fraud perpetrated by some FPCs in recruiting prospective students negate the benefits of convenience and opportunity FPCs offer to the postsecondary student demographic.
a. The Good
FPCs fill an important void in the current higher education infrastructure by catering to an "underserved at-risk [student] population. ' 132 FPCs
often attract nontraditional students such as working adults and other prospective part-time students who simply cannot, or do not, fit within the
traditional model of higher education-especially minority and low-income
students. 133 Accordingly, FPCs offer perhaps the most convenient form of
postsecondary education. They provide an amenably conducive option for
attaining a college education or specialized training through flexible scheduling options, a multitude of online courses, relatively small class sizes, and
local campuses. Also, unlike most nonprofit or public institutions, many
FPCs offer an abundance of night and weekend classes in order to accommodate nontraditional learners with the need for a pliable higher education
environment. As a result, FPCs are more individual-oriented models of
postsecondary education.
129. United States Department of Education, Office of Inspector General, Transparency of Proprietary Schools' Financial Statement Data for Federal Student Aid Programmatic Decision Making:
Final Report, 3 (July 23, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/aboutoffices/listloig/auditreports/fy2013/a0910001
.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29, 2014).
130. See id.
131. Sen. Tom Harkin, United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee,
Emerging Risk?: An Overview of Growth, Spending, Student Debt and Unanswered Questions in ForProfit Higher Education, 2 (June 24, 2010), http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4c23515814dca
.pdf (last accessed on Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Harkin Report 2010]; see National Conference of
State Legislatures, For Profit Colleges and Universities (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/for-profit-colleges-and-universities.aspx#Federal%20Action (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
132. Anthony J. Guida Jr. & David Figuli, Higher Education's Gainful Employment and 90/10
Rules: Unintended "Scarlet Letters" for Minority, Low-Income, and Other at-Risk Students, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 131, 137-41 (2012) [hereinafter Guida & Figuli Article].
133. Melissa L. Millora, Market Values in Higher Education:A Review of the For-ProfitSector,
UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, 4 (2010), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/
2q5856m8 (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013); see Vasanth Sridharan, The Debt Crisis in For-ProfitEducation:
How the Industry Has Used FederalDollarsto Send Thousands of Students into Default, 19 GEO. J.ON
POVERTY L. & POL' 331, 334 (2012); National Conference of State Legislatures, For Profit Colleges
and Universities (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/for-profit-colleges-and-universities.aspx#Federal%20Action (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
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Quite frankly, many individuals would be deprived of the opportunity
to attain higher education if not for FPCs. Conceptually, many institutional aspects unique to FPCs give educators at them the ability to gear
course curricula to a specific student's personal educational needs, making
for a personable education that could likely increase the probability of success. But, despite the benefits FPCs offer to the postsecondary student
demographic, from 2010 to the present, these institutions have garnered
much negative publicity.
b.
i.

The Bad
High Costs and Unjust Contribution to the Student Debt Crisis

FPCs are educational business models geared toward making a profit.
In fact, given their corporate nature and marquee classification, FPCs possess an obligation to make a profit. However, unlike their public and nonprofit counterparts, FPCs generally do not benefit from numerous tax
advantages or other subsidies.' 34 Nevertheless, FPCs do enjoy the fruits of
Title IV federal revenue.135 "Because student need is the primary determinant of the amount of federal aid and debt awarded, and because such aid
follows the student (and not the institution), there has been significant
growth in federal aid that has gone to proprietary institutions in recent
years."'1 36 Consequently, through receipt of both federal and private student loan revenue, FPCs add to the already troublesome student debt crisis. 1 37 And they do so in a noticeably inequitable manner. In 2010, the for-

profit industry received thirty-two billion dollars from federal student aid,
which was about 23% of the total federal student aid program funds. 13 8
Yet, in 2010, FPCs only accounted for 105 of the total postsecondary student population.139 More current data reveals that FPCs account for 13%
of total postsecondary enrollment and receive approximately 25% of the
134. Nat'l Assoc. for Coll. Admission Counseling, The Low-Down on For-ProfitColleges, http://
www.nacacnet.org/issues-action/LegislativeNews/Pages/For-Profit-Colleges.aspx (last accessed Dec. 29,
2013).
135. As noted earlier, the 90/10-rule creates a statutory constraint on the amount of federal aid
revenue FPCs may receive under Title IV of the Higher Education Act; a FPC may only receive 90% of
its total revenue from federal sources, while the other 10% must be derived from nonfederal sources.
See Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24), (d) (2013); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.14,
668.28 (2013).
136. Guida & Figuli Article, supra note 132, at 132 (citing Department of Education, Federal Pell
Grant Program, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpg /index.html).
137. United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, For Profit Higher
Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success, Executive
Summary, 1 (July 30, 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for-profit-report/ExecutiveSummary.pdf (last accessed Dec. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Senate HELP Report 2012 Executive Summary]
("As a result of high tuition, students must take on significant student loan debt to attend school [at forprofit colleges]."). The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee conducted a twoyear investigation-from 2010-2012-of the for-profit postsecondary education industry, in which approximately thirty FPCs were monitored and investigated. Given this investigation's very thorough
documentation and analysis, which has yet to be more recently duplicated, much of foregoing text and
statistics are primarily based on the findings of this investigation.
138. Harkin Report 2010, supra note 131, at 4.
139. Id.
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total federal student aid revenue.140 Thus, FPCs receive a vastly disparate
share of federal student revenue within the higher education industry.

Nonetheless, FPCs generate the majority of their revenue by enrolling
students and charging tuition, as opposed to receiving federal grants, state
funds/subsidies, or private donations/endowments. The more students enrolled at a FPC, the larger the revenue cash flow. Thus, FPCs must be
devoted to the continuous enrollment of students in order to sustain their
financial livelihood and to meet their profit goals. Accordingly, federal stu-

dent loan revenue derived from enrolled students ("for-profit students")
primarily funds FPCs.
In addition, the cost of a for-profit education is not exactly the most
reasonable or affordable in the industry."4 ' One of the main drawbacks of
FPCs is the price tag of tuition and related program costs. The average
costs at FPCs are far more expensive than public colleges.142 Not to mention, FPCs methodically increase tuition costs to meet profit expectations,
rather than increasing tuition costs to financially offset an increase in educational or institutional expenses. 1 43 As a result, most for-profit students
must take out loans to cover the cost of attendance at FPCs. In fact, forprofit students are more likely to borrow than public or nonprofit students.14 4 Approximately 96% of all for-profit students take out student
loans; compared to only 13% of students at community colleges, 48% at 4year public4 5 institutions, and 57% at 4-year private, non-profit
institutions.1

Yet, although for-profit students borrow more than their public or
nonprofit counterparts on the whole, "disproportionate borrowing alone
may not be a problem if disadvantaged students can easily pay back their
140. See Bill Swindell, Gretchen Wright, & Shannon Gallegos, New Data Confirm Troubling Student Loan Default Problems: For-ProfitColleges Still Have Highest Rate, The Institute for College Access and Success (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/CDR_.2013_NR.pdf (last accessed Dec.
26, 2013) [hereinafter TICAS Report]. The Report illustrates that FPCs account for 13% of total postsecondary enrollment in the United States while public four-year institutions account for 33%, public
two-year institutions account for 37%, and private nonprofit institutions account for 17% of postsecondary enrollment. In addition, the Report illustrates that FPCs receive approximately 25% of the total
federal student aid revenue.
141. Senate HELP Report 2012 Executive Summary, supra note 137, at 3 ("Most for-profit colleges charge higher tuition than comparable programs at community colleges and flagship State public
universities.").
142. Id. The average certificate program at FPCs costs 19,806 dollars (versus 4,249 dollars at
public colleges), the average associate degree costs 34,988 dollars (versus 8,313 dollars at public colleges), and the average bachelor degree costs 62,702 dollars (versus 52,522 dollars at public colleges).
143. Id. (finding "examples of tuition increases being implemented to satisfy company profit
goals, that have little connection to increases in academic and instruction expenses, and demonstrate
that for-profit education companies sometimes train employees to evade directly answering student
questions about the cost of tuition and fees").
144. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Rajeev Darolia, College Costs and FinancialConstraints: Student
Borrowing at For-ProfitInstitutions, 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.upjohn.org/stuloanconf1Cellini_ Darolia
.pdf (last accessed Dec. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Cellini & Darolia Analysis]. In analyzing the for-profit
industry, Cellini and Darolia relied on data compiled by National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS).
145. Senate HELP Report 2012 Executive Summary, supra note 137, at 7.
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debt after graduation."1'46 In other words, for-profit student-debtors are
not repaying the loans they borrow. Student loan default rates among forprofit student-borrowers are the highest in the postsecondary education
sector. 147 For-profit student-borrowers default on their student loans at a
rate of 47%.148 The abysmal default rate of for-profit student-borrowers
creates an unsettling problem amongst the for-profit industry because it is
indicative of many for-profit student-debtors' inability to pay their student
debt. In addition, student-borrower ignorance of the student loan process 1 49 may have partially contributed to the high rate of default among
for-profit students, because many students simply do not possess adequate
knowledge of available or favorable loan repayment options, such as in150
come-based repayment as opposed to term-based repayment.
Moreover, some FPCs charge more for tuition than students are able
to receive from federal student aid. Accordingly, many for-profit students
are forced to seek additional means of educational funding, such as private
student loans' 5 1 ("PSLs"), to supplement federal aid. As a result, for-profit
students are more likely to borrow through PSLs than their counterparts at
public and non-profit institutions. 1 52 These students "add PSLs to their
debt mix at5 3roughly twice the rate of students in comparable non-profit
1
programs.,

However, due to the emerging risk of student loan default among forprofits students, many private lenders-such as third-party banks-have
146. Cellini & Darolia Analysis, supra note 144, at 6.
147. Id.; see TICAS Report, supra note 140.
148. See TICAS Report, supra note 140.
149. Currently, there is proposed legislation addressing this issue of student borrower ignorance.
See H.R. 3892, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014) (as introduced on Jan. 15, 2014), available at http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg /BILLS-113hr3892ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr3892ih.pdf (last accessed Feb. 18, 2014). The Student Loan Borrowers' Bill of Rights Act of 2013 seeks to "ensure struggling student loan borrowers are
treated fairly and understand the full range of repayment options and resources available to them."
Durbin, Reed, Warren: Student Loan Debt is Hurting America's Middle Class, available at http://www
.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press releases?ID=9324f6b4-c6Oa-4ee5-86ba-a0eedfl5f71a (last accessed Jan. 29, 2014) (offering an overview of the proposed legislation in a press release). Moreover,
the Know Before You Owe Act of 2013 ". .. would require schools to counsel students before they sign
on to expensive, even unnecessary private student loan debt and inform them if they have any untapped
federal student aid eligibility," as well as "require the prospective borrower's school to confirm the
student's enrollment status, cost of attendance, and estimated federal financial estimated federal financial aid assistance before the private student loan is approved." See id.; see also S. 113, 113th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 2 (2013) (as introduced on Jan. 23, 2013).
150. Jon Marcus, The other reason grads are drowning in debt, CNN MONEY, Oct. 22, 2012, http://
money.cnn.com/2012/10/22/pf/college/student-loan-debt/.
151. As used in this Comment from this point forward, "private student loans," or "PSLs," refers
to any educational loan or benefit not: (a) issued under Title IV of the Higher Education Act or (b)
administered and issued by any governmental unit or agency on behalf of the federal government,
including but certainly not limited to: (1) private institutional loans, (2) private (third-party) student
loans, (3) any derivation of the two, and (4) any combination of the two.
152. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, PrivateStudent Loans: Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, the House of Representatives Committee on FinancialServices, and the House of Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce, 33 (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201207-cfpb-Reports-Private-Student-Loans.pdf (last accessed Dec. 29, 2013).
153. Id.
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abandoned the practice of lending to for-profit students.1 54 And "[w]hen
bank-funded private student loans became unavailable to students at forprofit schools, some proprietary programs [institutions] began lending directly to their students in response." 1 5 Typically, these institutional loans
carry extraordinarily high interest rates ranging from 11% to 18%.156 Additionally, some publicly-traded FPCs have "turned to third party administered private student loan programs," where the institution "provides
credit enhancement to one or more lenders" such as trusts that in-turn
purchase the loans from specific for-profit institutions-fostering very risky
quasi-institutional loans that often result in losses for FPCs.15 7 Ultimately,
FPCs that partake in private student lending usually rely on the revenue
from these loans to satisfy the 10%
quota of nonfederal revenue necessary
58
to maintain Title IV eligibility.
In the end, FPCs undoubtedly receive a disproportionate share of federal student loan revenue. Yet, many for-profit students must borrow from
more than one lender to finance their education because of elevated tuition
costs at FPCs. And given that for-profit student-borrowers exhibit high
loan default rates and a corresponding inability to repay student loan debt,
the educational integrity of many FPCs has warranted considerable
criticism.
ii. Educational Deficiencies
Since 2009, many FPCs have been subject to considerable scrutiny
from both Congress and the media for the deficient brand of education
they provide.'5 9 The quality of education provided at FPCs tends to be
substandard, especially given the price tag of tuition. Simply put, for-profit
student-graduates generally do not receive a fair return on investment because completion of an educational program at these institutions does not
ensure career or skill competency, which decreases the prospect of gainful
employment and future ability to repay student loans. 6 ° As one critic has
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Senate HELP Report 2012 Executive Summary, supra note 137, at 7.
157. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 152, at 33-4. The fact that for-profit students are defaulting on these private or institutional student loans places a burden on FPCs to recoup
such losses elsewhere, creating pressure on private-lending FPCs to maintain 10% of their revenue
from nonfederal student aid-or risk losing Title VI eligibility altogether.
158. Sipley, supra note 122, at 272-74.
159. Specifically, the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee (Senate HELP
Committee), led by Committee Chairman Senator Tom Harkin, has mounted a full-fledged assault on
the for-profit education industry, pointing out dire inefficiencies of FPCs when it comes to student loan
debt, poor quality of education, and quasi-fraudulent practices produced by their operation within the
postsecondary education system.
160. Barry Yeoman, The High Price of For-Profit Colleges, American Association of University
Professors (May-June 2011), available at http://www.aaup.org/article/high-price-profit-colleges#.UsBHI
6Xuods (last accessed Dec. 28, 2013) ("'These schools offer the false hope of being born again as an
educated person,' says former St. Louis mayor Clarence Harmon, the ex-president of one such institution, Sanford-Brown College in Hazelwood, Missouri. 'But they're throwing students to the wolvesgraduating people who are not competent in fields that may not exist in three or four years."').
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noted, FPCs "offer the false hope of being born again as an educated person" but are "throwing students to the wolves-graduating people who are
not competent in fields that may not exist in three or four years."16' 1 Thus,
these days, the value of a for-profit education is highly questionable.
Additionally, in many instances, for-profit students procure a great
deal of student debt without receiving a degree. Retention rates at FPCs
tend to be very low while dropout rates are the highest in the postsecondary industry. 162 In fact, more than half of for-profit students drop out
without receiving a degree.1 63 Interestingly, for-profit student dropout
rates differ depending on the type of degree sought' 64 and FPCs with
higher tuition rates do not show better student retention. 165 Nevertheless,
many for-profit students incur a substantial amount of debt without completing their education. Accordingly, the costs of withdrawal or dropout
can be dire because there still exists the obligation to repay student loans
issued prior to withdrawal, and the prospect of gainful employment and a
future ability to repay student loan debt is fundamentally curtailed as a
result of withdrawal. Thus, it is fair to conclude that a for-profit student
dropout is much more likely to default on student loans, increasing the
probability of future financial insolvency.
Further, the strong turnover in student enrollment at FPCs intuitively
discounts the need or incentive for these institutions to make academic or
educational judgments to better retain students and ensure graduate competency and success. Rather, FPCs tend to make more beneficial business
judgments such as raising tuition rates to meet profit expectations 166 or increasing recruitment expenditures.1 6 7 Given that many FPCs exhibit very
high dropout rates, these institutions must not be making the necessary
academic adjustments to retain students. Consequently, many FPCs are
not ensuring that students get the education or specialized training for
which they have become indebted to obtain.
In sum, comparing the asymmetrical intake of student loan revenue to
the quality of education being provided to for-profit students, many FPCs
are flagrantly underperforming when it comes to providing higher education and ensuring student success. As a result, the for-profit industry has
contributed to the overwhelming amount of student debt and hindered the
161. Id.
162. Senate HELP Report 2012, supra note 121, at 72-74.
163. Id. The average dropout rate for all thirty institutions investigated was 54.4 %.
164. Id. at 74-75.
165. Id. at 79 ("The mismatch between student retention and tuition charges points to a larger
lack of accountability in the for-profit higher education sector.").
166. Id. at 37 ("The obligation to satisfy shareholders means that many for-profit colleges set and
raise tuition based on the internal financial projections of the company, rather than the cost of educating students .... [T]uition increases at for-profit colleges are not driven solely by external economic
pressures, nor are they tempered by internal cost-saving measures, but rather, are often the result of
strategies designed to maximize revenue.").
167. Id. at 81-88 (asserting that expenditures on recruiting, marketing, lobbying, and executive
compensation, individually and collectively, far outweigh instructional or academic spending at FPCs).
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progression of educational development in our country. And sadly, it gets

worse.
c.

The Ugly

From television ads riddled with staged testimonials to billboards
promising a bright future, FPCs have utilized a media blitz to recruit prospective students. 168 Successful recruitment is a vital lifeline of FPCs. Poor
recruiting will not lead to copious student enrollment and continuous flow

of tuition revenue many FPCs have become dependent upon. So to ensure
successful recruiting, FPCs spend exorbitant amounts of revenue on
recruiting and marketing their brand. 169 However, "successful" recruitment in the for-profit industry does not necessarily equate to ethical or
honest recruitment. As a result, an egregious charge against the for-profit
industry is that many FPCs often employ fraudulent recruiting practices to
sustain high enrollment and associated profits. 70
By law, FPCs must disclose any institutional or educational deficiencies to prospective students; failure to do so may result in fines or loss of
Title IV eligibility. 171 Yet, in some instances, FPCs openly attempt to
deceive the consumer, whether in commercial advertising or even face-toface communication with prospective students. Generally, this deception

serves to mask deficiencies regarding a FPC's accreditation, program affordability and financing, graduation rates, and post-graduate gainful employment opportunities. And because such deceptive and fraudulent
conduct is presumably volitional and FPCs "disproportionately enroll[ ] independent, minority race/ethnicity, and low income students,"'1 72 several
FPCs have employed a predatory approach to maintaining enrollment
168. Yeomansupra note 160 (stating that FPCs "blitz the airwaves with promises of fast, focused,
hands-on training. The schools offer testimonials from former students-or actors playing former students-who claim to have turned their lives around after attending proprietary schools.").
169. For Profit Schools: The Student Recruitment Experience, SEN. HRG 111-1160, 111th Cong. 2d
Sess. (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg78780/pdf/CHRG111shrg78780.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2014).
170. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR PROFIT COLLEGES:
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED

IN DECEPTIVE AND

QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (Aug. 4, 2010) (statement of Gregory D. Kutz before the

United States Senate Committee on Health, Education Labor and Pensions), available at http://www
.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf (last accessed Jan. 15, 2013).
171. Id. at 6 ("In order to be an educational institution that is eligible to receive Title IV funds,
Education statutes and regulations require that each institution make certain information readily available upon request to enrolled and prospective students. Institutions may satisfy their disclosure requirements by posting the information on their Internet Web sites. Information to be provided
includes: tuition, fees, and other estimated costs; the institution's refund policy; the requirements and
procedures for withdrawing from the institution; a summary for the requirements for the return of Title
IV grant or loan assistance funds; the institution's accreditation information; and the institution's completion and graduation rate. If a college substantially misrepresents information to students, a fine of
no more than $25,000 may be imposed for each violation or misrepresentation and their Title IV eligibility status may be suspended or terminated. In addition the FTC prohibits 'unfair methods of competition' and 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices' that affect interstate commerce.").
172. Cellini & Darolia Analysis, supra note 144, at 1.
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numbers and profits by preying on the most vulnerable class of college
students. 7 3
Furthermore, many FPCs game the HEA's 90/10-rule 74 by manipulating the requirement that FPCs must receive at least 10% of their revenue
from nonfederal sources. 175 Currently, military student aid, such as educational funds disbursed pursuant to the GI Bill or other military tuition assistance benefit program (collectively "military student benefits"), is not
considered federal revenue under Title IV of the HEA-even though such
military student benefits are "federally" funded like federal student
loans. 1 76 Accordingly, FPCs game the 90/10-rule by aggressively recruiting
and enrolling members of the military, including military veterans. Be-

cause of this "loophole," conceivably, FPCs are permitted to take in an
unlimited amount of federal revenue, without any statutory repercussions.
Essentially, because military student benefits do not constitute "federal"
revenue for purposes of the 90/10-rule, many FPCs often evade true compliance with the 90/10-rule. Despite proposed legislation to close this loophole, until Congress effectively halts the exploitation of military personnel
by enacting legislation, the integrity of the current federal student aid programs and protection of the federal investment in higher education will
continuously experience devastating setbacks.1 77
In the end, several FPCs have stretched ethical and legal bounds to
ensure a continuous flow of federal money. Aggressive recruiting tactics,
high tuition costs, disproportionate student borrowing, high student loan
default rates, and low graduation, retention, and graduate employment
rates have all become commonalities in the for-profit industry. These commonalities detrimentally contribute to the student debt crisis. And though
the for-profit industry should not be used as a scapegoat for the current
173. Peter Fenn, For-ProfitColleges Must Crack Down on Predatory Practices: Taxpayers spend
billions of dollars on what has been shown too often to be fraudulent and totally ineffective education
programs, U.S. NEWS, May 7, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-fenn/2012/05/07/forprofit-colleges-must-crack-down-on-predatory-practices.
174. Sipley, supra note 122, at 272-74.
175. See generally Daniel J. Riegle, Closing the 90/10 Loophole in the Higher Education Act: How
to Stop Exploitation of Veterans, ProtectAmerican Taxpayers, and Restore Market Incentives to the ForProfit College Industry, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259 (2013).
176. Id. at 267; see Durbin, Harkin, Cohen: Congress Should End Loophole that EncouragesForProfit Colleges to Target Veterans and Servicemembers (Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www
.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreeases?ID=5d89cc27-9d3a-4865-9f9b-abda42795d9c (last accessed Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Durbin Proposal].
177. See Durbin Proposal, supra note 176. Senators Durbin and Harkin have proposed the Protecting Our Students and Taxpayer Act (POST Act), which would eliminate the loophole currently
allowing proprietary institutions to exploit military personnel and veterans so as to comply with the 90/
10-rule. Id. Nesting the proposed legislation under the Defense Appropriations Act of FY 2014, the
Senators have proposed specific "language requiring the inclusion of the Defense Department's voluntary military education programs (Tuition Assistance for servicemembers and MyCAA for their
spouses) in the federal 90/10 calculation." Id. In addition, the POST Act would "re-instate the [old] 85/
15" rule, requiring proprietary institutions to receive 15% of the total revenue from nonfederal sources.
See id. For a thorough discussion of the old 85/15 rule, see Rebecca R. Skinner, InstitutionalEligibility
and the Higher Education Act: Legislative History of the 90/10 Rule and Its Current Status, Cong. Research Serv., RL32182 (2005), available at http://www.research.policyarchive.org/1904.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 25, 2013).
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student debt crisis, many FPCs have contributed to it in a socially and economically unacceptable manner by placing profits above students. Therefore, there is a need for competent legislation to combat the collective
problems posed by the for-profit industry and student debt crisis.
B.

Current Efforts to Tend the Wound

Based upon the for-profit industry's inequitable contribution to the
student debt crisis and ever-devastating deficiencies, a crucial problem has
been born. Based upon this problem, the question begs, how do we protect
for-profit students and "fix" the for-profit industry? As a result, the contemporary problems created by the for-profit industry have not gone unnoticed-especially by those on Capitol Hill. Congressional lawmakers have
proposed a few ways to treat or manage the inequitable intrusion of the
for-profit industry within the postsecondary education framework. These
measures involve increased administrative oversight through strict federal
regulations. The most publicized plan for managing problems created by
the for-profit industry has been the "Gainful Employment" rule and its
accompanying regulations ("Gainful employment regulations").
Since 2010, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) has become a congressional
crusader for more stringent regulatory legislation and increased oversight
of the for-profit industry. In his relentless investigation of the for-profit
industry in 2010, Senator Harkin proclaimed that the problems presented
by the for-profit industry and the devastating effect those problems have
on the postsecondary education system have given rise to a serious "need
for rigorous government oversight and prudent regulation to safeguard the
investments of taxpayers and students."1'78 In 2012, amidst the release of
Senator Harkin's full report on the for-profit industry,17 9 such rigorous
government oversight and regulation was sought by way of the Gainful
Employment regulations.
To be legally characterized or recognized as a "proprietary [for-profit]
institution of higher education," a school must provide "an eligible program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation."1 80 As used here, "gainful employment" is a conceptual phrase
or term of art. Gainful employment may be defined in layman fashion as
an "employment situation where the employee receives consistent work
and payment from the employer."18' 1 In the legal context, "gainful employment" is often defined by what it is not. "[T]he phrase need not mean 'any
job that pays.' 'Gainful employment' does not unambiguously encompass
work for minimal gain, nor does it necessarily describe the gross profits
178. Harkin Report 2010, supra note 131, at 1.
179. See generally Senate HELP Report 2012, supra note 121.
180. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(A)(i) (2013) (emphasis added).
181. Business Dictionary, available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gainful-employment.html (last accessed on Jan. 15, 2014) ("Employment situation where the employee receives
consistent work and payment from the employer. Gainful employment is most often associated with
college graduates who become employed after they graduate as a way to measure or rank the college or
university where they received their education and training.").
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from a given activity rather than the net gains derived therefrom. 18 2 In
light of the controversies surrounding the for-profit industry, among which
is the problem of "ungainful" or inadequate education, it seems the only
persons that are gainfully employed are FPC executives' 8 3 and their lobbyists. 1" Nonetheless, the most recent efforts by the United States Department of Education ("DOE") to establish regulatory standards for
postsecondary programs to prepare college students for post-graduate gainful employment is a proactive initiative to "fix" the for-profit industry.
On July 1, 2012, in response to Senator Harkin's Report on the forprofit industry's disregard for its obligation to prepare students for gainful
employment, the DOE enacted the Gainful Employment regulations 185 to
address college "students' ability to repay their student loans" following
graduation based upon the effectiveness of gainful employment educational programs.18 6 Thus, the primary purpose of these regulations was to
ensure that college students were being adequately prepared for sustainable employment after graduation. The Gainful Employment regulations
consisted primarily of administrative oversight by the DOE over the quality of education offered and received by postsecondary institutions, including FPCs.' 187 However, the DOE does not have the authority to determine
the quality of higher education that postsecondary institutions must exhibit-such authority is reserved to accreditation agencies. 8 8 On June 30,
2012, a federal court found that most of the Gainful Employment regulations did not legally conform to a proper interpretation of the HEA. t89
182. Ass'n of Private Coils. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 146 (D.D.C. 2012).
183. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Profits, Not Student Success, Drive Executive Pay at For-ProfitColleges, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., July 27, 2012, http://chronicle.com/ article/Profits-Not-StudentSuccess/133217/; see also Melissa Korn, House Democrat Probes Executive Pay at For-Profit Colleges:
Maryland Representative Seeks Salary Details at 13 Schools Reliant on FederalStudent Aid, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10 001424052970203430404577095163719942338.
184. Tyler Kingkade, For-Profit Colleges Spending Millions On Lobbying, Nearly $40 Million
Since 2007, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/30/for-profit-colleges-lobbying-n_1842507.html 9.
185. Gainful Employment in a Recognized Occupation, 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2013).
186. Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education,
69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 439, 446 (2012).
187. Id.
188. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2013) (divesting the Department of Education of authority to regulate
curricula or administration of any educational institution); see also U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT
NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 18-19 (2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items /d09600.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29, 2014) (recognizing that
under the Higher Education Act, the "[Department of] Education does not determine the quality of
higher education institutions or their programs; rather, it relies on recognized accrediting agencies to do
so.").

189. A substantial part of the Gainful Employment regulations was held invalid as a result of a
legal challenge, while some regulations remain administratively in tact. See generally Ass'n of Private
Coils. & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 158 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding "[tlhe Department [of
Education] has set out to address a serious policy problem, regulating pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of its statutory authority. But it has failed to provide a reasoned explanation for a core
element of its central regulation. Both that regulation and those that depend upon it must therefore be
vacated. Because the disclosure requirements, 34 C.F.R. § 668.6(b), are not so intertwined with the
vacated debt measure, they will remain in effect.").
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Yet, the perseverance for Gainful Employment regulations remained
strong in light of judicial defeat. Nearly one year later on June 12, 2013,
the DOE sought to "establish a negotiated rulemaking committee to prepare proposed regulations for the Federal Student Aid programs authorized under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 ...., 90 However,
given the current stalemate on negotiated rulemaking, Gainful Employment regulations are merely futile and unenforceable administrative aspirations whereas the DOE has been left "to write its own [HEA-conforming]
rule."19 Nonetheless, placing the stalemate on Gainful Employment regulations aside, there is no certainty that more stringent government oversight and regulation will be able to solve the problems created by the forprofit industry. Perhaps regulations may mitigate the problems, if ever legally implemented, but the focus should be on healing the prevalent
wounds-not simply treating them. More regulations are not likely to heal
the wounds, but changing the law would be a worthwhile means of salvation for for-profit students, subtle reform of the for-profit industry, and
avoidance of a more devastating student debt epidemic.
IV. A

WORKABLE AND

COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION

Even at the sunset of the recent Great Recession, despite some light at
the end of the gloom economic tunnel, bankruptcy filing numbers remain
relatively high.1 92 In fact, about 332,000 consumers had a bankruptcy notation added to their credit reports in the fourth financial quarter of 2013
alone.19 3 Meshing this statistic with a United States population that has
swelled to almost 320 million people, more than one in every one thousand
persons filed for bankruptcy in that four-month span last year. 194 Evidently, people are still seeking relief from insurmountable debt through
bankruptcy. Unfortunate student debtors are no exception to this bankrupt class of persons, and more importantly, for-profit student-debtors are
perhaps most vulnerable.
190. Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 78 Fed. Reg. 35179-01, 35180 (Department of Education
June 12, 2013).
191. Kelly Field, 'Gainful Employment' Talks End at an Impasse, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Dec. 16, 2013, http://chronicle.comlarticlelGainful-Employment-Talks-End/143641/; see also Nat'l Assoc. of Indep. Colls., No Consensus on Gainful Employment (Dec. 16. 2013), available at http://www
.naicu.edu/news-room/detall/no-consensus-on-gainful-employment (last accessed on Jan. 15, 2013).
192. 2012 Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 2012: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/StatisticslJudicialBusiness/2012/us-bankruptcy-courts.aspx (last accessed Jan. 6,2013) ("The 1,261,140 bankruptcy petitions
filed in 2012 represent a 14 percent decline from the previous year's total and the lowest total since
2008, when individuals and businesses filed 1,042,806 petitions. This year, terminations of bankruptcy
cases fell 11 percent to 1.304,429. Because terminations exceeded filings, the number of pending cases
dropped 3 percent to 1,623,916.").
193. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research and Statistics Group, supra note 109.
194. United States Department of Commerce, U.S. and World Population Clock, available at
https://www. census.gov/popclock/ (last accessed Feb. 17, 2014). The arithmetic required to reach this
conclusion is as follows: 332,000 bankruptcy filings + 320,000,0000 persons in the U.S. = 0.0010375, or
1.03 bankruptcy filings per 1000 persons.
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Numbers generally do not lie. The statistics surrounding the for-profit
industry are uninviting and alarming to say the least. The future of the forprofit student demographic is not promising. Inevitably, there will be many
for-profit students driven into bankruptcy, in part, because of the outstanding student debt, often inadequate education, and corresponding "ungainful" employment associated with their for-profit education. Thus,
there is and will be a need to save the honest, yet unfortunate for-profit
student-debtor. Carefully and strategically amending the Bankruptcy
Code, specifically § 523(a)(8), could be a feasible means to healing-not
merely treating or managing-the prevalent wounds created by the forprofit industry, and simultaneously mitigating the troublesome student
debt crisis.
A.

Shifting the Risk

Sometimes an adjustment can do a world of good. As it pertains to the
for-profit industry, there is a noticeable imbalance between the quality of
education provided and the amount of money received by FPCs for their
services. To correct this imbalanced and inequitable intrusion into higher
education at the expense of nontraditional and often low-income students,
an adjustment in the law-not in government oversight or regulation-is
necessary. Accordingly, amending § 523(a)(8) would be a practicable adjustment to make.
Under § 523(a)(8), if an insolvent for-profit student-debtor qualifies
for bankruptcy ("qualified student-debtor"), there is a grim chance that he
or she will be able to discharge any student loan debt under the undue
hardship exception. Yet, even supposing that a qualified student-debtor is
able to satisfy the undue hardship exception and subsequently granted a
discharge, an underlying drawback is that most of the student debt would
be owed to the federal government. Consequently, the American taxpayers stand to suffer a loss as a result of a successful student loan discharge.
Thus, under the current form of § 523(a)(8), the American taxpayers bear a
sizeable risk of for-profit student-debtor insolvency and subsequent discharge of student loan debt in bankruptcy. This should not be the case.
A crucial purpose in amending § 523(a)(8) should be to shift the
a95
away from the American taxpayer and toward the for-profit indusrisk
try. A "hit them where it hurts" approach must be taken to ensure that
FPCs are properly incentivized to improve their deficient educational program structure, high-priced tuition, and questionable recruiting operations.
Because FPCs rely on PSL1 96 revenue to comprise the nonfederal revenue
requirement under the HEA's 90/10-rule, 197 an amendment to § 523(a)(8)
195. The term "risk" as used in this Section refers to the risk of for-profit student debtor insolvency and subsequent discharge of student loan debt in bankruptcy.
196. See supra note 151.
197. A criticism against the Higher Education Act's 90/10-rule is that it "focuses on inputs rather
than outputs." Matthew A. McGuire, Subprime Education: For-ProfitColleges and the Problem with
Title IV Federal Student Aid, 62 DUKE L.J. 119, 147 (2012). "Because an institution's greater reliance
on federal student aid is associated with poorer student outcomes, the rule attempts to ensure that a
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should directly target the 10% element19 8 of the 90/10-rule by strategically
increasing the 90% element. 199 In other words, to shift the risk toward
FPCs and away from the American taxpayer, § 523(a)(8) must be amended
to create an exception to the Presumption that would permit only qualified
student-debtors to presumptively discharge their PSL debt in bankruptcy.
As a result, amending § 523(a)(8) would only provide shelter to qualified
for-profit student-debtors who have unfortunately fallen into bankruptcy,
while targeting FPCs that abuse the privilege of federal funding and contribute to the debtor's insolvency. Conversely, such an amendment would
not benefit a solvent for-profit student-debtor who desires to arbitrarily
erase or cancel his or her student loan debt so as to uphold the Presumption's founding principle to deter bankruptcy abuse.
B.

Amending § 523(a) (8)

Since 1978, Congress has been reluctant to entertain the idea of automatic student loan discharge in bankruptcy, hence the prominence, and
perhaps deterring myth, of the § 523(a)(8) Presumption. But currently,
given that the for-profit industry is in congressional crosshairs and the present stall on Gainful Employment regulations, Congress has perhaps grown
impatient with the for-profit industry. And given the student debt crisis
and the for-profit industry's exacerbation of it, Congress is more likely now
than ever to entertain the idea of changing the law to aid bankrupt studentdebtors who have fallen victim to the for-profit industry's inequitable
brand of higher education. Now is the time to amend § 523(a)(8).
As discussed earlier, FPCs operate and profit primarily from federal
student loan revenue. So, increasing the risk of losing this continuous flow
of federal money is a viable means of incentivizing the for-profit industry to
provide a more affordable and gainful education or training to those who
seek it in a nontraditional learning environment. Accordingly, Congress
should amend § 523(a)(8) to (1) create an exception to the Presumption to
allow qualified student-debtors to systematically discharge any and all PSL
debt in bankruptcy, and (2) provide a process by which discharged PSL
debt would directly factor into the debtor-specific FPC's 90/10 compliance
20 0
calculation (collectively the "Amendment").
school offers an education of sufficient quality to attract funds independent of those guaranteed by the
federal government." Id. Thus, if there were a way to focus the 90/10-rule toward output (providing a
better quality education) rather than input (increasing enrollment of nonfederal student aid students),
then the rule would serve a more useful purpose. As this Comment discusses later, amending
§ 523(a)(8) to shift the risk of student insolvency, and subsequent bankruptcy discharge, would seek to
ensure gainful output by the for-profit industry through incentives to maintain Title IV status, making
the 90/10-rule more output-oriented. See infra Section IV(B).
198. When referring to the 10%, the reference is being made to the requirement that FPCs must
receive at least ten percent of their total revenue from nonfederal sources.
199. When referring to the 90%, the reference is being made to the requirement that FPCs cannot
receive more than ninety percent of their total revenue from federal sources, such as Title IV student
loans or other federally-backed educational benefits.
200. Under this framework, federal student loan debt would still be subject to the Presumption
and debtors would have to qualify for the undue hardship exception under § 523(a)(8) to discharge
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The underlying concept of the Amendment is to decrease the amount
of federal revenue a FPC is allowed to receive and increase the amount of
nonfederal revenue a given FPC must earn in order to maintain Title IV
eligibility under the HEA's 90/10-rule. Under the Amendment, discharged
PSL debt would have to directly factor into the for-profit student-debtor's
specific FPC's ("debtor-specific FPC") 90/10 compliance calculation as federal revenue-even though it is technically nonfederal revenue. 20 1 This
theoretical legal paradigm may be better conceptualized as a balancing
scale with federal revenue on one end, and nonfederal revenue on the
other. Given these mandated proportions, the scale is already extremely
lopsided to begin. Nevertheless, because many FPCs' total federal revenue
often straddles close to the legally permissible threshold,2"2 even the slightest increase in federal revenue would prompt unilateral action by a FPC to
earn more nonfederal revenue in order to bring the revenue ratio scale
back to where it must be legally balanced at 90/10.
Keeping this "balancing scale" concept in mind, under the Amendment, the amount of each qualified debtor's discharge of PSLs would constitute federal revenue, thus contribute to the 90% calculation of the
debtor-specific FPC's 90/10 revenue ratio-making the scale tilt even more
toward the federal revenue end. In turn, because the discharge would add
to the federal revenue end of the scale, the debtor-specific FPC would then
be forced to offset the discharge by acquiring more nonfederal revenue.
The FPC would most probably accomplish this offset by issuing more institutional loans or by personally securing private third-party student loans.20 3
However, in the event that the debtor-specific FPC does not take action to
federal student loans in bankruptcy. Realistically, given the legislative history behind § 523(a)(8), Congress is very unlikely to entertain the idea of presumptive discharge of federal student loans in bankruptcy, or a total abolishment of the Presumption altogether. Notwithstanding, there has been recent
legislation (e.g., The Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013) proposing such a measure, but it is
very unlikely to survive congressional muster. See S. 114, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (2013) (as introduced
on Jan. 23, 2014); see also supra Section II(C)(1).
201. For this to work as suggested, the private student loan debt discharged under this Amendment will have to be considered federal revenue for purposes of 90/10 compliance. Specific language in
the proposed Amendment to § 523(a)(8) itself would accomplish this effect. The Amendment would
need to expressly link the discharged student debt to the for-profit student-debtor's specific FPC's 90/10
calculation pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24) and 34 C.F.R. § 668.28(a). See infra Section IV(C).
202. From July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012, 804 out of 2,057 for-profit institutions (39.1%) received
between 80% to 90% of their total revenue from Title IV sources, while 29 for-profit institutions exceed the legal threshold and violated the 90/10-rule. United States Department of Education, Office of
Federal Student Aid, ProprietarySchool 90/10 Revenue Percentages:2011-2012 Award Year Summary
Chart (June 17, 2013), available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/school/proprietary (last
accessed Jan. 29, 2013); United States Department of Education, Office of Federal Student Aid, Letter
to CongressmanJohn Kline, Chairmanof the Committee on Education and the Workforce, from Brenda
Dann-Messier, Assistant Secretary of Education (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/
sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/901OLetterKline2Ol3.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29, 2014).
203. Although, FPCs may simply recruit military personnel more aggressively to manipulatively
comply with the 90/10-rule because military student benefits are not currently considered Title IV federal funds. See Riegle, supra note 175, at 267. Though the Author agrees revenue deriving from military student benefits should be legislatively recognized as federal revenue under Title IV, as many other
scholars have fervently advocated, elaborate discussion on the issue is outside the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, this Comment provides a solution for this problem. For purposes of a proposed
Amendment to § 523(a)(8), as this Comment provides, specific language in the Amendment itself could
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offset, the FPC would risk exceeding the maximum federal revenue threshold under the 90/10-rule and consequently risk Title IV eligibility, directly
jeopardizing the often-profitable flow of federal revenue to the institution.
By forcing for-profit institutions to offset an increase in "federal" revenue
resulting from the presumptive discharge of PSLs (nonfederal debt), the
risk of for-profit student insolvency and bankruptcy discharge of student
debt would be shifted toward the for-profit industry. Subsequently, FPCs
would then have more skin in the game, which breeds incentive for these
institutions to provide a more affordable and gainful education to their
students.
The fact that a qualified student-debtor would be able to presumptively discharge such debt in bankruptcy (like any other form of consumer
debt) would likely incentivize FPCs to place a greater emphasis on improving core education programs rather than on recruiting, executive salaries,
or shareholder profit margins. This would also likely lead to more focus on
student retention, rather than student enrollment. Additionally, FPCs
would be encouraged to enhance efforts to help for-profit students attain
gainful employment following graduation because an un-gainfully employed graduate, and even more so a for-profit student dropout, would be
more likely to become insolvent and discharge PSL debt. Consequently,
low retention and high dropout rates would play a factor in 90/10 compliance calculation because such statistics would intuitively increase the possibility of student debtor insolvency, which could place the institution at risk
of losing Title IV revenue under the Amendment.
Moreover, the systematic effect on FPCs' conduct under this approach
would be two-fold. First, if a qualified debtor were permitted to discharge
PSLs,2 °4 the FPC's own cash flow and/or credit would likely be affected by
the debtor's discharge. The result of discharge would be that the debtorspecific FPC would have to "forgive" or write-off the debtor's institutional
loan debt and/or assume the debtor's private third-party loan debt (at least
those that are FPC-secured or administered loans). Consequently, the
debtor-specific FPC would lose the money it fronted on the discharged
loan(s) as well as forfeit any associated profits. Second, as a result of discharge, if the debtor-specific FPC is close to the maximum federal revenue
threshold (90%), the FPC would be forced to offset the discharged amount
of debt by issuing more institutional loans and/or personally securing more
private, third-party student loans in order to comply with the 90/10-rule
and avoid Title IV eligibility restriction, or even revocation.
Thus, this model creates a revolving and self-incentivizing cycle
whereby an FPC would have to either (1) ensure student competency and
success through better, more affordable educational programs, or (2) assume more financial risk by lending to, or securing loans for, students. In
sum, allowing for the presumptive discharge of PSLs presents an ultimatum
directly accomplish the effect of recognizing military tuition/education assistance funds as "federal"
revenue for purposes of 90/10 compliance. See infra Section IV(B)(3).
204. See supra note 151.
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to the for-profit industry, which would likely help better ensure future forprofit student competency, more affordable for-profit education, and even
gainful employment.
C. Text of the Proposed Amendment

It is often argued that proposed legislation should be enacted according to its original language and purposed intent, without being subject to
congressional dickering. In essence, this concept of streamline legislation
may be said to preserve the proposed legislation's original purpose. However, for better and worse, Congress employs a non-streamlined legislative
process for enacting laws. Nonetheless, in the case of amending the law,
legislative drafters are still tasked with providing an initial written form of
proposed amendments. Keeping with the process and in conforming to the
principles previously discussed, drafters of the Amendment to § 523(a)(8)
should substantively enumerate, though not necessarily verbatim, the following provisions:
(1) A qualified debtor seeking to discharge private student
loan debt is not subject to the Presumption codified at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a), and such debt shall be presumptively dischargeable if.
(a) the debtor has completed his or her postsecondary
education or career training, albeit from a for-profit,
public, or private nonprofit institution of higher education; or
(b) the debtor possesses a serious physical, mental, or
health-related condition or any other extenuating circumstance exists (as determined at the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105) that substantially impairs the debtor's ability to fulfill the requirement under subsection (a) above.
(2) Where a qualified debtor has failed to complete his or
her postsecondary education or career training by the time
of discharge, and absent extenuating circumstances:
(a) the debtor's private student loan debt shall be dischargeable, in whole or in part, at the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105; or
(b) the debtor's private student loan debt shall be presumptively dischargeable upon condition that the
debtor complete his or her education or career training
within a reasonable time following discharge.
(3) Any amount of discharged private student loan debt
shall be considered Title IV federal revenue and factor into
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the debtor-specific for-profit institution's 90/10-rule compliance calculation as such pursuant to Higher Education Act
§ 487(a) (as codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24)) and accompanying regulations (34 C.F.R. §§ 668.14, 668.28(a)), while
other regulations and administrative processes required to
ensure this provision's enforcement are charged to the
United States Department of Education.
(4) For purposes of this section, "private student loan debt"

refers to any and all debt comprised of:
(a) private institutional student loans or any derivative
form thereof;
(b) private third-party student loans or any derivative
form thereof;
(c) any combination of the two specified in subsection
(a) and (b) above; and
(d) any educational loan or financial benefits not otherwise issued by a governmental unit or agency pursuant
to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq.), including student benefits or financial assistance issued pursuant to
the GI Bill or any other comparable military student tuition assistance program.
(5) For purposes of this section, "qualified debtor" refers to
an individual debtor, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 109, who:
(a) qualifies and properly files a petition for bankruptcy
pursuant to criteria required under any chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code;
(b) is a former college student who graduated or withdrew from a proprietary institution of higher education
as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1002; and
(c) seeks a discharge of private student loan debt incurred as a result of his or her attendance at a proprietary institution of higher education as defined by 20
U.S.C. § 1002.
Provisions (1), (2), and (3) provide the heart of the Amendment,
which directly attacks the comprehensive problem20 5 facing the higher education system. Definitional provisions (4) and (5) provide specific language
205. As outlined earlier in this Comment, the "comprehensive problem" consists of the (1) student debt crisis, (2) inequitable intrusion of for-profits into higher education, and (3) dire need for
reform of the for-profit industry.
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identifying what forms(s) of private student loan debt is presumptively dischargeable, and who can discharge it. Basically, provision (4) sets forth
that any non-Title IV loan or nonfederal student aid-thus any private student loan or military student benefits (closing the 90/10 "loophole")-is
presumptively dischargeable. Provision (5) merely serves to define and reinforce who exactly is permitted to discharge such private student loan
debt. The collective purpose of these provisions is to permit a qualified
debtor to presumptively discharge private student loan debt, legally convert or consider such discharged debt as "federal" revenue, and factor that
federal revenue figure into the debtor-specific FPC's 90/10 calculation. As
a result, for each discharge under this Amendment, the debtor-specific
FPC's federal revenue flow will increase (increasing the 90% element of
the 90/10 calculation), creating a higher risk of noncompliance with the 90/
10-rule. As noted, this effect is meant to incentivize the for-profit industry
to provide affordable and gainful postsecondary education or career training. Consequently, if this measure is successful, many FPCs will be forced
to abandon their bad habits, which in turn, would not result in a negative
impact on the student debt crisis.
In addition, provisions (2) and (3) provide another distinct incentive.
The purpose of these provisions is to stress and encourage completion of
higher education or specialized career training if the debtor is able. The
idea is that qualified debtors who prematurely withdraw (drop out) from
their for-profit education or career training should be encouraged to follow
through with their investment in higher education. Further, these provisions do not restrict the manner in which the debtor can complete his or
her education. The debtor may choose any avenue of higher education to
fulfill his or her investment in higher education, albeit by way of public,
private nonprofit, or for-profit institutional instruction. Nevertheless, these
provisions provide an incentive (discharge of private student loan debt) for
qualified debtors to finish and attain a college education or specialized career training. And in a practical sense, requiring completion would likely
provide the debtor with more long-term benefits, so as to aid in the
debtor's overall financial rehabilitation or fresh start and better ensure the
debtor's future fiscal well-being. At a minimum, the effect of these provisions would probably decrease the likelihood that the debtor will become
insolvent and file for bankruptcy again as a result of an ungainful education
or training. In any event, the preceding provisions represent specific principles that should be substantively injected into the Amendment to
§ 523(a)(8), perhaps by creating a new subsection to § 523(a)(8).2 °6
D. An Alternative Solution: Amending the Higher Education Act
Some scholars and legislators have proposed another approach to
counter the problems presented by the for-profit industry. This approach
206. These principled provisions could be nested under a new subsection to 523(a)(8), for example
"523(a)(S)(C)."
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calls for amending the HEA to change the 90/10-rule, specifically to increase the 10% minimum on nonfederal revenue while reciprocally decreasing the 90% cap on federal revenue. Again, the idea is that FPCs are
too dependent on federal revenue for their financial sustenance, and decreasing the amount of federal funding that FPCs are allowed to rely on
will incentivize better behavior. Proposed changes to the HEA's 90/10-rule
range from reinstating the old 85/15-rule 20 7 to enacting a 55/45-rule.
Looking first at the low end of these extremes, reverting back to the
old 85/15-rule would not have much effect at all. A 5% decrease in federal
revenue available to FPCs would be a menial start, but is it really enough
to incentivize the entire for-profit industry? Without something more, reverting back to the 85/15-rule would likely have little impact on the forprofit industry and almost no effect in curbing the rampant and unacceptable behavior exhibited by many FPCs. While perhaps very small FPCs
will feel the impact of a 5% decrease in federal revenue, the vast majority
of FPCs would likely not be affected because larger FPCs are more flexible
in terms of developing alternative sources of revenue apart from Title IV
federal funds. And the reciprocal 5% increase in required nonfederal
funding resulting from a reinstatement of the old 85/15-rule would also
have little effect on large FPCs while smaller FPCs would likely be less
adaptable to the change. Given the fundamental goal of incentivizing better behavior by the entire for-profit industry, it would be futile for Congress
to reinstate the 85/15-rule.
In addition, enacting a 55/45-rule would do more harm than good.
Most recently, Daniel Riegel has suggested that Congress change the 90/10rule to a 55/45-rule. 0 8 In his article, Riegel outlines the history of the 90/
10-rule, specifically highlighting the old 85/15-rule, and expounds on the
"loophole" in the 90/10-rule that military student benefits 0 9 are not factored into FPC's 90/10-rule compliance calculation.210 Ultimately, Riegel
asserts that "Congress must amend the 90/10-rule to (1) count Post 9/11 GI
Bill benefits as federal, not private, sources of revenue, and (2) lower the
cap on federal revenue from ninety to fifty-five percent of a for-profit college's total revenue."' 211 The measure to count military student benefits as
federal revenue so as to halt FPC's exploitation of military personnel and
207. For a thorough discussion of the old 85/15 rule, see Rebecca R. Skinner, InstitutionalEligibility and the Higher Education Act: Legislative History of the 90/10 Rule and Its Current Status, Cong.
Research Serv., RL32182 (2005), available at http://www.research.policyarchive.org/1904.pdf (last accessed Jan. 25, 2013); see also Protecting Our Students and Taxpayers Act of 2013, H.R. 3496, 113th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2013) (as referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce). The
Author completely agrees with this proposed legislation (POST Act) in the sense that military educationltuition assistance funds should be considered federal revenue for purposes of 90/10 compliance,
but disagrees with reverting back to the old 85/15 rule because doing so would probably not be beneficial for the stated reasons provided below.
208. See generally Riegel, supra note 175.
209. See Section III(A)(2)(c) for brief review of the military student benefits 90/10 "loophole,"
and Section IV(C) for this Comment's solution.
210. See generally Riegel, supra note 175.
211. Id. at 259.
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veterans is admirable and should be done, but Riegel's 55/45-rule proposal
would not be the best solution. Riegel proposes that Congress enact a 55/
45-rule whereby FPCs would be required to receive 45% of their total revenue from nonfederal sources. 2 12 Though Riegel's proposal may be considered an easier and more streamlined solution than amending § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code, it presents two damaging problems.
First, a 55/45-rule could likely drive corporations, like those that own
many FPCs, out of the postsecondary market. A 55/45-rule would make
the higher education market appear less attractive, and therefore less lucrative, to many for-profit corporate executives and shareholders. As a result,
there is a fair possibility that there would be a mass exodus of FPCs from
higher education given such a dramatic shift (from 90% to 55%) in federal
funding available to FPCs. Such a result would severely diminish the opportunity of higher education that FPCs currently offer many low-income,
nontraditional learners. A 55/45-rule would create the appearance that
Congress is attempting to eradicate the for-profit industry by substantially
decreasing the flow of federal funds to FPCs.
Second, amending the HEA to include a 55/45-rule would alarm the
for-profit industry. Such a predictable congressional move would be a blaring blip on the for-profit industry's radar, putting it on notice that federal
funding availability is in dire jeopardy. Because the for-profit industry possesses a very influential lobby, proposing legislation for a 55/45-rule would
give the for-profit industry enough time to wage war against its enactment
through extensive lobbying efforts.2 13 Consequently, there is a great
probability that legislation to enact a 55/45-rule would be quashed, or legislatively diluted to a point of mootness, before even gaining speed in
Congress.
In contrast, amending the Bankruptcy Code would be more subtle, unpredictable, and inconspicuous. Given that bankruptcy law does not generally affect the for-profit industry's steady flow of federal funding, amending
to the Bankruptcy Code would not cause as much adverse commotion as
amending the HEA. Consequently, amending § 523(a)(8) would be more
inconspicuous than amending the HEA's 90/10-rule. Congressional action
to create an exception to the § 523(a)(8) Presumption by permitting the
discharge of PSLs by qualified student-debtors would likely not be met
with swift opposition by the for-profit industry and its powerful lobby.
Amending § 523(a)(8) would likely be "ghost" legislation that would fly
212. Id. at 276-77.
213. The lobbying power of the for-profit industry was on full display when Gainful Employment
regulations were first proposed. See Gretchen Gavett, How the For-ProfitCollege Industry Took on the
Obama Administration (and Won), PBS, Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/education/college-inc/how-the-for-profit-college-industry-took-on-the-obama-administration-and-won/;
Eric
Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, For-ProfitColleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/201112/10/us/politics/for-profit-college-rules-scaled-back-after-lobbying.html
?page
wanted=all&_r=0; David Halperin, For-Profit Colleges Attack New Effort To Prevent Fraud With $32
Billion of Your Tax Dollars,available at http://www.republicreport.org/2012/for-profit-college-ads/ (last
accessed Jan. 29, 2014).
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under the for-profit industry's radar. Hence, in the event of amending
§ 523, the for-profit industry's lobbying influence would be marginalized, if
not completely circumvented. In the end, Congress should seek to subtly
reform the for-profit industry, not chase it out of the market.
Additionally, unlike amending the HEA, the purpose of amending
§ 523(a)(8) is not to ostensibly eradicate, or appear to eradicate, the forprofit industry-it is merely to incentivize good behavior by subtle, yet effective means. As noted earlier, FPCs fill a crucial void in higher education
by offering a viable postsecondary infrastructure for nontraditional learners. FPCs serve a vital, beneficial function by providing educational opportunities to persons who otherwise would not have the opportunity to attain
a college education in the traditional postsecondary environment. However, this benefit of educational opportunity is outweighed by many FPCs'
detrimental predatory practices that intentionally target at-risk students,
and it does not justify the unbalanced intake of federal dollars with little to
no accountability or legal repercussions.
Nonetheless, in theory, the proposed Amendment to § 523(a)(8) will
technically have the same effect as amending the HEA; amending § 523
would simply employ different means to attain the same end. Under either
measure, amending § 523 or the HEA 90/10-rule, the end result sought is to
increase the amount nonfederal revenue FPCs must receive in order to
maintain Title IV eligibility, while simultaneously decreasing the amount of
federal revenue FPCs receive. Amending the HEA (Education Code), a
piece of legislation directly linked to the for-profit industry's business,
would raise too many red flags, while amending § 523 (Bankruptcy Code)
likely would not. Consequently, amending § 523(a)(8) is a more practicable means to saving the unfortunate for-profit student demographic from
the educational and fiscal inequities created by the for-profit industry, as
well as providing a viable and workable means to solving emerging
problems that plague the postsecondary education system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The for-profit industry can play an important role in the postsecondary
education market by providing many nontraditional learners with the convenience and opportunity to attain a college education or career training.
But, in many cases, the means in which these institutions operate to provide that service are highly questionable. Consequently, the for-profit industry has made an indelible wound on higher education in the United
States, the scars of which may remain for a long time. Through their inequitable conduct, many FPCs have considerably contributed to the overwhelming amount of student debt, stumped the progression of quality
higher education, and placed an unnecessary burden on the United States
economy. In sum, many FPCs in the for-profit industry have received more
than they have given back to the higher education system.
The for-profit student demographic deserves legal salvation from the
imprisoning chains of student debt incurred as a result of attending for-
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profit institutions and receiving inadequate education or training from
them. Given the current state of affairs surrounding the for-profit industry
and its negative effects on the student debt crisis and for-profit students,
there is a need to take action so as to save unfortunate for-profit studentdebtors who have fallen-or who are at a greater risk of falling-into
bankruptcy through no fault of their own. Under the current form of
§ 523(a)(8), insolvent for-profit student-debtors are left without a reasonable legal mechanism to rid themselves of the imprisoning debt they have
incurred as a result of seeking higher education at for-profit institutions.
Amending § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code should be considered as
practical and viable congressional action to provide available relief to qualified student-debtors in the unfortunate event of bankruptcy, as well as an
indirect avenue of reforming the for-profit industry.

